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Sherman: Agrarian Work in the U. S. A.  
Elections in France and Czechoslovakia

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
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**ALEXANDER SAMOILOVICH MARTYNOV**



## In Memoriam, Alexander Samoilovich Martynov

THE Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is deeply grieved to announce the death, on June 5 of this year, of Alexander Samoilovich Martynov (Pieker), one of the oldest participants in the revolutionary movement in tsarist Russia and a member of the C.P.S.U.

\* \* \*

The Executive Committee of the Communist International is grieved to announce the death of Comrade A. S. Martynov (Pieker), an old participant in the revolutionary working class movement, member of the C.P.S.U., and member of the staff of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The death took place on June 5, 1935, after a serious and prolonged illness.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

### IN MEMORY OF A COMRADE

A revolutionary has breathed his last, one whose name is connected with the entire history of the revolutionary working class movement of tsarist Russia. He was a revolutionary who, in his declining years, broke resolutely and irrevocably with Menshevism, the Second International and the friends with whom he was linked up by decades of joint political activity, as soon as he became convinced as to what a counter-revolutionary swamp reformism had led.

The very full life led by Martynov is the finest example for millions of Social-Democratic and reformist workers of how they should break with reformism, Menshevism, and take up their stand on the side of Communism, honorably and to the end.

The first years of the more than fifty years of Comrade Martynov's political activity were connected with the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will); the last twelve years were given to the Bolshevik Party.

On the borderline of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Martynov was the leader of the Russian Economists—a variety of the Western European revisionism of the Bernstein school. He then became one of the leaders of the Russian Mensheviks. In the persons of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and of Martynov, in the shape of Bolshevism and Menshevism, two opposite and hostile lines in the working class movement confronted each other; namely, the proletarian revolutionary line and the reformist Menshevik line.

After the October Revolution, when the Russian Mensheviks came out openly on the side of counter-revolution, Comrade Martynov broke

with Menshevism, and openly, honestly, took the side of the proletarian revolution, of the Soviet government, of Communism. This was a blow to the remnants of Russian Menshevism. That is why the Bolshevik Party, the Party of Lenin and Stalin, accepted Comrade Martynov into its ranks at its Twelfth Congress in the year 1923. The Congress believed in the sincerity of Comrade Martynov's transition to Communism. Martynov justified the trust placed in him, working untiringly for twelve years in the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

In our epoch, when socialism is achieving world-wide historic victories in the U.S.S.R., when big revolutionary battles of the international proletariat are approaching, when the Social-Democratic workers are beginning to turn to the Communist International, the shining example of the life of Comrade Martynov, who found his way to Communism, may serve as a guide to all those supporters of reformism who are seeking for salvation from the horrors of fascism and capitalist exploitation.

Comrade Martynov is dead. He was a man who, at the age of seventy, still possessed clarity of thought and youthful daring. With what buoyant joy he met every new achievement of socialist construction! How passionately he believed in and waited for revolutionary battles of the workers against fascism!

G. DIMITROV, D. MANUILSKY, V. KNORIN, O. PIATNITSKY,  
O. V. KUUSINEN, WILHELM PIECK, ERCOLI, WAN MING,  
BRONKOVSKY, RICHTER, POLLITT, LOZOVSKY, BELA KUN,  
KANG SIN, TOM, KOLAROV, CHEMODANOV, HECKERT,  
SHERMAN, GROSSMAN, DENGEL, GRUNEBERG, SMOLINSKY,  
HOPNER, TSCHAKAYA.

### WE LOWER OUR BANNERS

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany together with Communists throughout the world are grieved at the death of Comrade Martynov. In him the world Communist movement has lost one of its best fighters for Communism, one endowed with a high Marxian training.

The road taken by Comrade Martynov is edifying to the German working class movement. Martynov, who for several decades was one of the leading figures in the ranks of Russian Menshevism, understood the colossal world historic importance of the October Revolution and took up his stand on the side of Bolshevism, on the side of the Party of Lenin. Openly and with a pure heart he subjected his Menshevik views to a radical revision, and became a Bolshevik. The Party of Lenin and Stalin readily accepted him into its ranks. Martynov became one of the best fighters in the front ranks of the world Communist movement.

In Germany his pamphlet, in which he gave the grounds for his transfer to Bolshevism and relentlessly criticized the views which he himself shared for many decades, was widely circulated. Martynov showed therein that on all questions of dispute between the Mensheviks



and Bolsheviks (dictatorship of the proletariat or the "democratic way to socialism", the estimate of the character and tactics of the Russian revolution in 1905 and 1917, "economism" or the revolutionary class struggle, the organizational principles of the Party, etc.), Lenin was right, and he, Martynov, was wrong.

For those Social-Democratic workers and officials, in Germany and other capitalist countries, who are already moving along the road towards Communism, Martynov's life is highly edifying. Martynov's arguments against his own past Menshevik views will help them to discover their own mistaken views and accelerate their passage to Communism.

For twelve years Martynov has fought shoulder to shoulder with us in the world Communist Party of Lenin. His articles in *The Communist International* on vital political problems have helped the German Communists as well to find their way in the serious struggle that is going on against fascism and reformism. The death of Comrade Martynov should serve to remind the Communist Party of Germany of the need to train its cadres untiringly in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

The Communist Party of Germany, together with all the Sections of the Communist International, lower their banners over the bier of Comrade Martynov.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

## An Interview with Comrade Stalin\*

**K**IEV, June 5—In connection with fifteenth anniversary of the break through the Polish front by the Red cavalry and the liberation of Kiev from the Polish interventionists, the Ukrainian press today reproduced an interview with Comrade Stalin originally published in *The Communist* on June 24, 1920, No. 140. The interview follows in full:

### INTERVIEW WITH COMRADE J. V. STALIN

The other day Comrade J. V. Stalin, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, returned to Kharkov.

Comrade Stalin spent about three weeks at the front; the offensive operations of the Red troops, which opened with the famous break through the Polish front by the Red cavalry, began and gradually developed in his presence.

### THE BREAK THROUGH

In a conversation with a representative of *Ukrrosta*, Comrade Stalin said:

In discussing the operations of our Red cavalry army on the Polish front at the beginning of June many people compare it—this piercing of the front of the enemy—with last year's raid by the Mamontov cavalry. But this is entirely incorrect.

The Mamontov operation had an episodic, partisan character, as it were, that was unconnected with the general offensive operations of the Denikin army.

The breaking through of the Red cavalry army is a link in the general chain of offensive operations of the Red Army.

The raid of our Red cavalry began on June 5. In the morning of that day the Red cavalry, ready for action, hurled itself at the Second Polish Army, broke through the enemy front, rushed through the Berdichev district, and in the morning of June 7 captured Zhitomir.

The details of the capture of Zhitomir and the trophies taken have already been reported in the press. I shall not talk of them, but will mark only some characteristic points. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Cavalry Army reported to the staff at the front: "The Polish army is full of scorn for our cavalry; we consider it our duty to prove to the Poles that the cavalry must be respected."

After the break through, Comrade Budyonny writes to us: "The Pans (Polish nobility) have learned to respect the cavalry; they run, falling over each other, and clearing the road for us."

The result of the break through was as follows:

The Second Polish Army which was telescoped by our cavalry army proved to have been put out of action; it lost over 1,000 men in prisoners and about 8,000 men were hacked to pieces.

The latter figure has been checked by me through several sources

\* Printed in the *Communist*, Russian edition, June 24, 1920.



and is a close approximation, especially as at first the Poles absolutely refused to surrender and our cavalry was forced literally to hack its way through. This was the first result.

The second result: the Third Polish Army (in the district of Kiev) proved to have been cut off from its rear and found itself faced with the danger of being surrounded; this led to its general retreat in the direction of Kiev-Korosten.

The third result: the Sixth Polish Army (in the district of Nizni-Podolsk), having lost its support on the left flank and fearing to be pressed against the Dniestr, began its general retreat.

The fourth result: from the moment of the break through our general rapid advance began all along the front.

#### FATE OF THE THIRD POLISH ARMY

Since the question of the fate of the Third Polish Army is to most people unclear I shall touch upon this in greater detail.

Out of touch with its base and isolated, the Third Polish Army found itself in danger of being captured as a unit. It therefore began to burn its trains, blow up its warehouses and spoil its guns.

After its first unsuccessful attempt to retreat in order, the army was forced to take to its heels (flight of the whole army).

A third of the army (altogether the Third Polish Army had about 20,000 combatants) was either captured or hacked to pieces; another third, if not more, threw away its arms and ran into the marshes and woods—dispersed.

Only the remaining third, or even less, succeeded in making its way to the Poles through Korosten. There can be no doubt that had not the Poles succeeded in rendering timely assistance by fresh units through Shepetovka-Sarnay, this part of the Third Polish Army would also have been captured or scattered through the woods.

In any event, it may be taken that the Third Polish Army does not exist; those of its remnants which reached the Poles are in need of extensive repairs.

To characterize the debacle of the Third Polish Army I must say that the entire Zhitomir road is littered with half-burned trains and automobiles of all kinds, the number of the latter, according to the report of the chief of the liaison department, reaching 4,000. We captured about 70 guns, no less than 250 machine guns and a vast number of rifles and cartridges not yet counted. Such were our trophies.

#### SITUATION ON THE FRONT

The present situation on the front may be described as follows: the Sixth Polish Army is retreating, the Second is being removed to the rear to be reformed, the Third practically does not exist. It has been replaced by new Polish units brought from the Western front and from far in the rear.

The Red Army is advancing all along the front and has crossed beyond the line of Ovruch-Korosten-Zhitomir-Berdichev-Kazatin-Kalinovka-Vinnitsa-Zhmerinka.

## CONCLUSIONS

It would be a mistake to think, however, that we are already through with the Poles on our front.

It must be remembered that we are fighting not only against the Poles but against the whole Entente which has mobilized all the dark forces of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and which supplies the Poles with all kinds of materials.

It is also necessary to remember that the Poles have reserves which have already been brought to Novgorod-Volynsk, the effect of which will undoubtedly make itself felt soon.

It is further necessary to remember that demoralization on a mass scale in the Polish army has not yet set in. There can be no doubt that there are battles ahead of us—bitter battles.

I, therefore, consider as improper the bragging and harmful self-satisfaction which is shown by some comrades; some of them are not content with the successes on the front and shout about a "march on Warsaw", while others, not content with the defense of our republic against the enemy attack, proudly declare that they can reconcile themselves only to a "Red Soviet Warsaw"

I shall not attempt to prove that this boasting and this self-satisfaction in no way correspond either to the policy of the Soviet government or to the condition of the enemy forces on the front.

I must state in the most emphatic manner that without the straining of all forces in the rear and at the front, we shall not be able to come out victors. Without it we shall not defeat the enemies from the West.

This is accentuated particularly by the Wrangel offensive which came as "a bolt from the blue" and has assumed threatening dimensions.

There can be no doubt that the Wrangel offensive has been dictated by the Entente in order to alleviate the difficult position of the Poles. Only naive politicians can believe that the correspondence between Curzon and Comrade Chicherin could have any other meaning except to cover up, by talk of peace, the preparations of Wrangel and the Entente for an offensive.

Wrangel was not yet prepared and for this reason (for this reason only) the "humane" Curzon asked Soviet Russia to spare the Wrangel units and grant them their lives.

The Entente apparently figured that at the moment when the Red Army would crush the Poles and move forward, Wrangel would come out in the rear of our troops and wreck all the plans of Soviet Russia.

There can be no doubt that the Wrangel offensive has considerably relieved the Poles, but there can hardly be reason to think that Wrangel will succeed in breaking through to the rear of our Western armies.

In any case, the immediate future will show the power and weight of the Wrangel offensive.



# The Lessons of the Elections in France and Czechoslovakia

ON May 5, the municipal elections took place in France, and on May 19 the parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia. The political importance of these elections goes far beyond the bounds of these two countries, as they clearly reflect the sentiments of the masses in the face of the bacchanalia of fascist terror in Germany, and of the fascist offensive in other capitalist countries. These elections displayed the unshaken confidence of the masses in the Communist Party as the initiator and chief organizer of the anti-fascist front, the spontaneous and mighty desire of the workers for the united fighting front against fascism and the capitalist offensive, and finally, showed the tremendously increased authority of the Soviet Union, and the importance of the struggle of the U.S.S.R. for peace, in ensuring the victory of the united front and in raising the class level of the international working class movement.

The victory of fascism in Germany, which gave courage to the bourgeoisie throughout the world to undertake fascist attacks on the working class, has not led to the decline of the international working class movement. On the contrary, a mighty anti-fascist wave has risen, which bears witness to the further sharpening of the class struggle and complicates the transition of the bourgeoisie to fascist methods of action against the toilers. The aims of the fascist process, besides being that of destroying the revolutionary working class vanguard, also seeks to extend the mass basis of monopolist capital, which is contracting more and more because of the pauperization, disillusionment and desperation of the masses, and particularly does it aim at keeping the leadership over the vacillating petty bourgeoisie, who have taken fright at the horrors of the crisis, in the hands of monopolist capital. For this purpose chauvinist propaganda is let loose, and the split in the ranks of the working class, which is the prerequisite for the fulfillment of the program of bourgeois dictatorship, is intensified. This is why the bourgeoisie and reactionary leaders of Social-Democracy, who have linked up their fate with capitalism, are so violent in their hatred of the slogans of the proletarian united front. "Why is the government silent?" exclaims Henri de Kerillis, a bourgeois journalist, in the *Echo de Paris* on the subject of the united front in France. For in the course of the successes of the united front, the conviction is becoming more and more widespread among broad masses of the Social-Democratic workers, that had Social-Democracy not collaborated with the bourgeoisie after the war, the working class would not be suffering the blows of the fascist offensive today.

From this point of view, the results of the elections in France and Czechoslovakia are of enormous international importance.

\* \* \*

In France, because the country was involved in the world economic crisis later than other countries, the bourgeoisie were able to develop demagogy about French "exceptionalism". The sharpening of the class contradictions after the beginning of the crisis, especially after the advent of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, led to a rapid differentiation in the camp of the bourgeoisie. With this was connected the much slower improvement in the economic situation associated with the transition to the depression (the "exceptional" position in the countries on the gold standard!). It promoted an increase in fascism and to a tremendous extension of the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat against the offensive of fascism and capital. The events of February 1934 constituted a huge success for the Communist Party of France in its struggle for the united front against fascism. The masses are seeking new methods. And this determines the fact that none of the demagogic tricks of individual leaders of the Socialist Party were able to hold back the further advance of the united front, which gave considerable strength to the working class against fascism, which, in its turn, also mobilized its forces. The fascist attack in February 1934 was repulsed. Fascism has not yet established a real mass base for itself in France. The united front has brought strength to the working class and the authority of the Communist Party has grown extremely. But the development of the contradictions of French capitalism still further increased the waverings of the petty bourgeoisie, and so the further successes of the proletarian united front and the correct policy of the proletarian vanguard towards the petty bourgeoisie will decide the question as to which stand will be taken by those masses of the French petty bourgeoisie who have moved from their former positions: for the national front against fascism and the capitalist offensive, or for the demagogy of the "francists" and of the as yet numerically insignificant national Socialist groups, with their demagogic promises of mass dismissals of foreign workers, confiscation of Jewish capitalists and an international agreement with fascism. At the canton elections in October, 1934, this struggle was already clearly apparent. While the Socialists, and especially the Radicals, lost some of their votes then, the Communists, on the one hand, and the Right and fascist groups, won seats.

During recent months the internal situation has become still sharper. The index figure for industry has dropped below the 1932 level and the French bourgeoisie are faced with tremendous financial difficulties, despite their gold reserves and stable exchange. The decrease in the budget, promised by Flandin at the beginning of the year, actually led to a deficit of six thousand million francs, to which there must be added a deficit on the railways of four thousand million francs. On the order of the day there is devaluation, mass dismissals of clerks, etc., and further robbery of the masses of the petty bourgeoisie.

This is why the communal elections held in May are especially symptomatic, in that they show what the united front of the working class can achieve. These elections took place in 38,000 communes with eleven and a half million electors, 400,000 deputies being elected. The



importance of these elections for France itself is also defined by the fact that the municipal councils provide the bulk of the electors for the senate. It is just this that explains the tremendous political struggle enacted around the municipal elections in which eight ministers of the government, 313 parliamentary deputies and 172 senators directly participated, and put forward their candidatures.

The most important result of these elections is the *political success* of the Communist Party, which won 43 municipalities. In Paris, the Communist Party obtained the first place with over 100,000 votes. There is now a Communist fraction of eight in the municipal council, where previously there was only Comrade Marty. Thanks to the geometry of the elections which gives as many seats to the central bourgeois quarters, which are sparsely populated, as to the thickly populated proletarian suburbs, the reactionary bourgeois elements still have a majority in the municipal council of Paris. But Paris is once more surrounded by a "red belt" of proletarian municipal suburbs. In the Seine district (without Paris) the Communists won 140,000 votes. In Marseilles, two and a half times more votes were cast for the Communists than previously. The number of votes in the mining districts of the North—the traditional fortress of the Socialists—has also increased.

The success of the Communist Party in the rural department of Correze, where the Communists won 38 municipalities, is extremely important. Here the Communists were successful in carrying on truly mass revolutionary work in the peasant organizations, without creating sectarian groups isolated from the masses, as was the case in other parts, but by speaking at rural mass conferences, getting their resolutions passed, and mobilizing the masses of the peasants for joint struggle with the proletariat against monopolist capital and fascism. There was an analogous situation in Nice, with its characteristic middle strata population, where the Communists increased their votes by 13 times, which shows what opportunities there are for winning broad strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie for the anti-fascist front.

Finally, the most striking political success of the Communist Party is to be seen in the canton elections in the Seine department (also without Paris), which took place after the municipal elections. These elections took place while violent attacks were being leveled by the whole of the bourgeoisie against the Communists in connection with the Franco-Soviet agreement. The bourgeoisie tried to create confusion in the ranks of the working class by interpreting this agreement to mean that the French Communists must now reject the class struggle against their own bourgeoisie. The Socialists also supported this campaign, although they did not break the united front. The renegade Doriot, lackey of the French bourgeoisie, who kept his seat at the municipal elections in Saint Denis only thanks to the solid support of all the bourgeois, reactionary elements, carried on a particularly, foul, slanderous campaign. The workers' reply was a devastating blow to the whole of the bourgeoisie and its renegade hangers-on. For here the Communists won the biggest victory of the whole of the election campaign; instead of the three

deputies which the Communist Party had before, during the first round it had already returned 12 deputies (and according to the latest information, it has won another 13 mandates in the second round).

*These elections have shown that the broad masses of the workers welcome the peace policy of the Soviet Union with enthusiasm, recognizing all the revolutionizing importance of the struggle for peace of the U.S.S.R. for their own class struggle.* It was not for nothing that Henri de Kerillis had to note with regret that his expectations that the Communists would be routed were not realized.

As compared with the canton elections held in the autumn of last year, there is the difference that in these elections the Socialists did not lose votes, but even won votes in some parts, and that the Radicals lost considerably less and even managed on the whole to maintain the previous level. But the confusion among the Radicals has still further increased, and separate groups of Radicals have not infrequently voted differently. As for the Socialists, they had to carry out the united front agreement under the pressure of the masses who felt an increase of confidence under the influence of the united front, although in some places the more reactionary elements of the Socialist Party formed a bloc with the bourgeoisie against the Communist candidates. A new feature is also that the Right and fascist groups declined, in the main, as compared with the autumn of last year. But the fascists have not been smashed. It is enough to point out that although they behaved in an extremely provocative manner, by putting forward, for example, the candidature of the former police prefect, Chiappe, who was discredited in the Stavisky affair and through his open connections with the fascists in February 1934, as the candidate in the center of Paris, the fascists nevertheless won actual votes, although they lost seats in Paris.

All this renders it necessary that the Communist Party exert still greater efforts to bring about the *united proletarian front* and the national front, so as to *beat off the new offensive that is being prepared by capital* (the Bouisson government means only a change in personalities and not a change in the program of the bourgeoisie) and *not to allow the creation of a mass base for fascism*. The Communist Party which acted independently during the first round, and joined forces with other organizations only where there was a direct danger of a reactionary candidate being elected, acted in accordance with these main slogans in the second round.

\*     \*     \*

The elections in Czechoslovakia took place in still more complicated circumstances than in France. Here the Social-Democrats took direct part in the government, which meant that the strongest resistance was immediately manifested by the leaders of Social-Democracy to the united proletarian front, under the flag of "defending democracy" and "safeguarding the republic". Surrounded on all sides by fascist revisionist governments, which are threatening the very independence of the Czech people, torn by contradictions with its numerous oppressed nationalities, constantly threatened by the mass revolutionary action in town



and country, the Czech bourgeoisie have, by means of a series of measures directed against the interests of the toilers and the fascization of the state apparatus, vainly tried to mitigate the influence of the crisis and of the very great difficulties arising out of it. These difficulties are increasing still more due to the sharpening of the international situation in Central Europe and, in particular, to the influence of the fascist dictatorship in Germany upon the political and economic development of Czechoslovakia. After the Saar plebiscite and the introduction of universal conscription in Germany, the propaganda of fascist organizations of the Hitler type in the German districts of Czechoslovakia led by Henlein has taken on unprecedented dimensions. The entire policy of national oppression conducted over a period of fifteen years by the Czech bourgeoisie with the help of the leaders of Czech Social-Democracy, prepared the success of this propaganda. In reply to this furious fascist campaign in the German regions, rabid chauvinist slander on the part of the Czech bourgeoisie and also of the bourgeoisie of all the other nations has begun. Under the flag of this chauvinist slander, repression against the Communist Party is being continually intensified, the Communist press is banned and revolutionary proletarian organizations are being closed down. At the same time the leaders of Czech Social-Democracy, as in no other country, are conducting a slanderous campaign against the Communist Party and the Communist International, striving to bring confusion into the ranks of the working class and to paralyze the efforts of the Communists to establish the united front. The leaders of Social-Democracy have invariably rejected the fighting united front against the anti-labor legislation planned by the bourgeoisie and on behalf of the most elementary democratic rights of the workers.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has, therefore, been working in extremely difficult conditions. For several months the entire bourgeois and Social-Democratic press had been shouting about "liquidating the political influence of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia". The press prophesied the "inevitable" downfall of the Communists at the elections. Even certain organs of the more "serious" European bourgeois press thought it their duty to subscribe in advance to this "prognosis". The bourgeois *Neue Züricher Zeitung* on May 20, a day after the elections (when the election results were not yet known), declared categorically that: "Since the Communists are experiencing a crisis and have lost their base among the population, the Social-Democrats and the Popular Socialists (the Benesh party) are hoping to compensate their inevitable loss to the nationalist camp by winning former Communist votes".

And here, as in France, the entire bourgeois and particularly the Social-Democratic press tried to bring confusion into the ranks of the working class by representing the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union as an "instruction" to all Communists to cease the class struggle against the bourgeoisie. Actually this was the same age-old nauseating fable, long ago exposed, about "Moscow gold" and "orders from Moscow";

just as though the working class "in the democratic paradise" of *Hamples and Czech* (both Social-Democratic leaders) have not enough reasons of their own for carrying on the class struggle against their bourgeoisie! Just as though there is no unemployment in Czechoslovakia, no wage reductions, no robbery of social insurance, no plundering of the peasantry, no repressions against revolutionary workers, no systematic cutting down of the toilers' democratic rights, won through long decades of resolute struggle, and just as though there is no national oppression there! And the toiling masses of Czechoslovakia replied worthily, by showing the *Hamples and Czechs* how high is the level of class consciousness of the Czechoslovakian proletariat.

The results of the parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia signify first and foremost the *political success for the Communist Party*, which is the more important since it was a tremendous surprise to the entire bourgeoisie. The Communist Party, which obtained 753,000 votes at the former elections in 1929, increased its votes to 849,000. Moreover, the most important thing is that the relation of forces in the chief Czech districts has seriously changed *in favor of the Communist Party*. In Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, the Communists, who formerly occupied third place, have now come out first, displacing the agrarians. In Slovakia, the Communists have overtaken the Social-Democrats. In Trans-Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia the Communist Party has now become the *leading* party of the working class, and at the same time has rallied round itself broad masses of the peasantry.

The Czech Social-Democrats, who entered into a bloc with the Jewish bourgeoisie in the shape of the Zionists, still remain approximately at the same level. The German Social-Democrats, who specialized particularly in sophisms against the united front and attempted to justify their policy of supporting all the measures of the government, and determinedly rejected the united front with the Communists against Henlein, suffered utter defeat; the votes received by the Social-Democrats dropped from 500,700 to 299,000.

But unlike the position in France, the fascists won *very important successes* in the German districts, and in the Czech districts their votes considerably increased. The Henlein fascist party obtained 1,250,000 votes, thus becoming the largest party in Czechoslovakia. Both Czech fascist groups together won as many votes as the Communists. The open fascist groups now have 22.8 per cent of all the votes, instead of 11.2 per cent as formerly. The Communists and Social-Democrats, who together had 40.5 per cent, now have only 37.7 per cent of the total number of votes. The fact that the Communists lost almost one-third of their votes in the German districts is extremely alarming. And this shows that in Czechoslovakia, fascism has become a very serious danger. Any *underestimation* of this danger not only in the German regions, but also in the purely Czech districts, where the fascist offensive is far from beaten, would have the most harmful consequences for the whole of the working class movement and the entire anti-fascist struggle in Czechoslovakia.



The success of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia is primarily the success of the united front tactics which mobilized influence for Communism and for the struggle of the U.S.S.R. for peace. Despite the difficulties placed in the way of the united front in Czechoslovakia by the Social-Democratic leaders, the Communists succeeded in developing a considerable movement in favor of the united front in Czechoslovakia during the election campaign, a clear expression of which was the demonstration to the Wenzelplatz in Prague, in which thousands of Social-Democratic and Popular Socialist workers took part. In the German districts of Czechoslovakia, just as was previously the case in the Saar, the Communists were not able sufficiently, energetically and, what is most important, sufficiently timely, to set against the pressure of fascist chauvinist agitation their program of social and national liberation, and to bring about the anti-fascist front on this basis.

These are the most important lessons of these two election campaigns. Fascism is far from beaten yet in these countries. The leader of German Social-Democracy in Czechoslovakia, Dr. Czech, when justifying himself before the Social-Democratic workers for his sabotage of the united front, declared that the offensive of fascism cannot at all be brought to a standstill. *But the offensive of fascism can and must be repulsed.* The election campaigns, in Czechoslovakia and in France, show perfectly clearly that this can be done only by the united front of the working class. Proof of this can also be found in several other election campaigns which have taken place recently in Europe, namely, the provincial elections in Holland and the elections to the Grand Council in Basle (Switzerland) and several others. In Holland a big fascist party, the "Moussart" party, has sprung up. But the Communists also have obtained a considerable increase in votes in several places and particularly in Amsterdam, in just those places where they conducted the united front policy consistently and correctly.

Secondly: these elections have once more exposed the Trotskyist-Social-Democratic legend about the counter-revolutionary nature of the petty bourgeoisie, who, they allege, are the inevitable bearers of fascism.

And finally, these elections revealed the further sharpening of class contradictions among the bourgeoisie, despite all the attempts that have been made to cover up these contradictions by means of chauvinism and fascist demagoguery. The more fascism, and in particular German national socialism, spreads its repulsive stench throughout capitalist Europe, the greater is the desire of the proletarians and all toilers and oppressed to rally together against the fascist danger, the stronger is their hatred of the capitalist regime, which has let loose the fascist beast in order to save itself, and the easier, and at the same time, the more responsible becomes the task facing the Communist Parties in connection with the mobilization of the masses for decisive struggle to overthrow the fascist dictatorship, and to destroy the entire capitalist system of exploitation and oppression.

## Fascist Plans to "Localize War" and the Revolutionary Struggle for Peace

**T**HE program which Hitler in his recent speech offered, in opposition to the struggle of the Soviet Union for peace, was a crusade against Bolshevism. "Fascism or Bolshevism" declared Hitler, with one foot on the breast of the toilers of Germany; and the masses are becoming convinced, by awful, bloody experience, that the overthrow of the hated fascist dictatorship is possible only by revolutionary, Bolshevik methods. "Fascism or Bolshevism", Hitler repeats, seeking to obtain the hegemony of German fascism in Europe and a "free hand" in the East against the U.S.S.R. But the land of proletarian dictatorship, as the bulwark of the toilers of all countries against the war that is being kindled by the fascists, as the center of gravity of all peoples seeking to maintain peace, is having more and more influence over world politics.

Presenting his account to the world bourgeoisie for "saving Europe from proletarian revolution", Hitler was forced to admit that the Communist menace is growing in Germany itself, although he and his colleagues have more than once declared that it had been "dragged out by the roots". Hitler is not in a position to hide the fact that in spite of the whole of his system of political banditry, medieval barbarity and brute force, despite all the bloody repressions directed against the Communist vanguard and the physical annihilation of the leaders and organizers of the working class movement, fascism has not succeeded in suppressing the advance of the masses towards revolution, or in arresting the further ripening of the revolutionary crisis. The roots of Bolshevism in Germany are so deep that although terrorist repression renders the work of the Communist Party extremely difficult, it does not weaken the authority and influence of Communism over the working masses, but, on the contrary, strengthens it.

It is precisely in the underground conditions of fascist Germany that the Communists have learned to understand the full vital importance of "the maximum flexibility of tactics", as taught by Lenin and Stalin and the need for "combining tremendous passion in the great revolutionary struggle with the coolest calculation of the feverish writhings of the bourgeoisie".

In demanding that the world bourgeoisie grant him an award for his hangman work, Hitler has some grounds for referring to the fact that as a result of the fascist coup d'etat in Germany, and in certain cases with the direct participation of Hitler's agents, the process of fascist development has been accelerated in capitalist countries, while fascist dictatorship has been established in many central European countries. But the question of "fascism or Bolshevism", which has been raised by the actual trend of the severe, relentless class struggle, leads to the weakening of Social-Democratic and reformist legalist illusions and pre-

judices among the working class, although by no means uniformly. The Social-Democratic workers are becoming convinced that there is no third road, no bourgeois democratic road, no "industrial peace", no "development into socialism", etc., as promised by their leaders; among the masses of workers the desire for unity is growing and readiness is being displayed to enter into a joint struggle with the Communists against the menace of fascism and war. The failure of the Social-Democratic policy and the deep differentiation inside the Social-Democratic organizations now give the Communists the opportunity of using united front tactics more extensively, more variedly, more universally and more boldly. It is precisely in fascist underground conditions and in the struggle against the fascist offensive, that something new in the united front tactics has come into existence and become consolidated, something that unites broad masses of workers the desire for unity is growing and readiness is being displayed. The fascist terror can deprive the German Communists of the opportunity they have of working to collect the forces of the proletariat to prepare for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship—and not for the purpose of establishing bourgeois democracy, but in order to win true democracy for the toilers, namely, Soviet Power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. And on an international scale, the proletariat is replying to the question "fascism or Bolshevism" by unity of action against fascism, by the fact that together with the Communists the Social-Democratic workers are setting in motion the general strike weapon (France, Spain), and taking up arms (Austria and Spain) in order to resist fascism.

Finally, those among the bourgeoisie, who have not as yet quite lost their heads, realize that the world war which the German fascists above all are kindling will lead to a revolutionary crisis in the capitalist countries, and in several of them to the victory of proletarian revolution. The world bourgeoisie do not feel at all "guaranteed" against revolution, behind the shield of Hitler Germany.

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The signing of defensive pacts of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and France and Czechoslovakia forced Hitler in his speech to have recourse to complicated maneuvers in order to cover up Germany's furious aggression. The fact that fascist Germany categorically refuses to join in these defensive pacts means that she is caught red-handed as instigator of an anti-Soviet war. At the same time, the mighty war machine which fascist Germany has built up, in violation of all her obligations, is forcing the Western European bourgeoisie to fear that Germany is preparing for "revenge" in the West as well. Not only are the countries of the Little Entente, the Balkans and the Baltic states directly menaced by the mailed fist of fascist Germany, but France and England must also reckon with the fact that Berlin can direct bombing planes, submarines, tanks and poison gases not only to the East, but also to the West.

This is why Hitler, the German aggressor, uses the mask of "peace" in his speech, while his military designs, especially his plan for an armed offensive against the U.S.S.R., are referred to as "localizing war".



"If contemporary Germany declares itself in favor of peace," said Hitler in his speech, "it is not in consequence of her weakness or out of cowardice. In its peace policy it is guided by the viewpoint of the people and the state inherent in nationalism. . . . The doctrine of national-socialism rejects the idea of national assimilation as a dogma."

But if fascism allegedly rejects even "the idea of national assimilation", and "national expropriation", then on the other hand, as we know, it is no less determined in insisting upon the right of Germany to expropriate foreign territory.

"If you want territory in Europe", we read in the fascist testament, Hitler's *My Struggle*, "you can have it, generally speaking, only at Russia's expense; to this end, the new empire would have once more to take the road of medieval, knightly orders, so that land for the German plough be won by the German sword, and daily bread for the nation."

How can one reconcile these two contradictory dogmas of Hitler's "peaceful intentions" on the one hand, not to assimilate foreign nations, and on the other, to seize their territories? We can do so by reading the third dogma, which consists in:

"Gradually creating border colonies on the newly acquired lands, populated *exclusively* by the bearers of the highest racial purity and therefore the highest racial endowments." (Hitler, *My Struggle*, Vol. II, p. 499.)

Thus the historical mission of the "German sword" consists not only in the conquest of foreign territories, but in transforming them into "border colonies", cleansed of all those who are not the "bearers of the highest racial purity". Woe to the conquered; complete annihilation awaits them as a result of the "peaceful intentions" of the fascists. A comforting prospect for the colonial peoples over whom Hitler seeks colonial mandates from the League of Nations and whom he intends to educate in a cultured manner, a "comforting" prospect for all the weak nations, upon whom the fascist bird of prey will throw itself after, or perhaps even before, it realizes the danger of poking its pig's snout into the Soviet garden.

"To localize war", in the language of German imperialism, means to safeguard the western rear of fascist Germany from France and England while Germany "decided the problem of colonizing Eastern Europe".

"I have my doubts", says Hitler in his speech, "about this thesis of the indivisibility of peace. . . . It [a big war] . . . can come about all the more quickly, the more rapidly the opportunity of localizing little conflicts lessens—through a network of different international obligations on all sides. Besides these considerations of principle, we have here another special case.

Contemporary Germany is a national-socialist state. The world of ideas which we possess is diametrically opposed to the ideology of Soviet Russia."

By camouflaging his policy of incitement to war with the slogan of localizing war, Hitler is striving after the following:

1. To "entice the petty-bourgeois masses at home with the prospect of what is apparently to be a "light", "rapid", "safe" war against an isolated enemy—"a military outing", which was what Wilhelm in his time, in 1914, promised his subjects. As far as fascism is concerned, "peace-loving" demagoguery is thus a means of increasing chauvinist propaganda among the masses, especially the older generation, which experienced all the horrors of the war of 1914-18.

2. German fascism is frightening the weaker nations with the danger of isolation that threatens them in case of war against fascist Germany. This terror in the sphere of foreign politics is accompanied by offensive intrigues and fascist provocation in the weaker countries (Goering's visit to the Balkans, Hitler's emissaries to the Baltic countries, the pressure being brought to bear upon the Scandinavian countries, etc.).

3. Of especial importance in getting together the anti-Soviet front, according to fascism, are its lying promises "to localize war". It says to the big imperialist countries: war against the U.S.S.R. is the only means of averting war in the camp of the imperialists themselves.

In the language of military fascist Japan, "localizing war" means safeguarding her naval rear from American and English naval and air forces, while she herself solves her historic problem on the front on the mainland—"Asia for the Asiatics", the final conversion of the whole of China into a Japanese colony, and hands outstretched to seize Soviet Siberia.

"Localizing war" in the language of Polish imperialism means, according to the "poetic" expression of the newspaper *Chas*, "to canalize German expansion in the East" for "there are conflicts which cannot be localized but there are some on behalf of which nobody intends to fight".

And in other countries, the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, imperialist elements of finance capital, who support German-Japanese aggression and are reckoning upon an anti-Soviet war, also prefer to act under the camouflage of "localizing war". Lieutenant Colonel North, a specialist on questions of the Far East, a follower of Lord Lothian, Hitler's well-known agent in England, at the "Foreign Politics" society, made the proposal that "Japan be given a free hand in Siberia".

"Was not a possible solution of the difficulty (Anglo-American-Japanese conflict in the Pacific) that Great Britain and the United States should *give Japan a free hand in Siberia, so that she might cease to interfere with British trade in China?* It was true that in Manchuria there was no great chance for the Japanese to expand, because the Chinese could live where the Japanese would starve, but the population in Siberia was more

sparse." (*International Affairs*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, March-April, 1935, pp. 169-170.)

It is characteristic that one can meet in the United States press, true not intended for the wide public, the opinion expressed openly that it would be advisable to localize war in Europe by directing German aggression to the East. Thus, in the *Annalist* (April 19, 1935), the author of an article "Wall Street's Pessimism" develops the viewpoint that "a localized European war would, of course, have no particularly favorable effect upon American business."

Further outlining the scheme of such a war, which is to be "not without advantage" to the U.S.A. the economic periodical continues:

"A localized European war would, of course, have no particularly unfavorable effect upon American business. . . . Germany can hardly expect to do more than attempt minor improvements of her position in the East. A rational German policy would appear to be to pursue her plans in the East only at such a pace as will not cause France to declare war against her. In the present situation in France, Germany can probably proceed to some lengths in the East before such a point is reached." (*Annalist*, April 19, 1935, p. 586.)

Thus, in all the capitalist countries, the representatives of the war industry, and heavy industry in general, are praying at any rate for a small, modest, localized war. These experienced robbers are building their calculations upon the certainty that the torch thrown at any point of Europe by the fascist incendiaries will inevitably bring about a war conflagration on a universal scale for the redivision of the globe. It is not surprising, therefore, that their attitude towards Hitler's struggle against pacts of mutual assistance in the East and in Europe is one of either open or covert sympathy.

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The following and similar facts show how rapidly war is approaching, and primarily the threat of an armed onslaught on the Soviet Union, namely, the growth of the anti-Soviet aggressiveness of German fascism, its feverish efforts to find allies in all imperialist countries, its "peace-loving" demagoguery and the response with which it is apparently meeting among certain sections of the bourgeoisie of other imperialist countries (Baldwin's declaration that after Hitler's speech he "destroyed the end part of his notes for his speech in Parliament", the German-Italian rapprochement and the corresponding recent renewal of anti-Soviet provocation and attacks in several Italian newspapers, etc.), as well as Japan's preparations for a "new jump", accompanied by the ultimatum to the authorities in North China and the "enveloping" of Chang Kai-shek.

But at the same time, revolutionary forces are growing and multiplying which are counteracting the war policy of the imperialist forces, which are making it possible to postpone the war and which are facilitating the regular mobilization of the working class to convert the war being kindled by the imperialists into proletarian revolution.



Only the land of proletarian dictatorship, which on its own territory has destroyed all the causes and the forces which make for imperialist wars, can conduct a firm, resolute policy of peace, a policy imbued with the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which satisfies the vital interests of the toilers of all humanity. Victorious socialism, the historic superiority of which, as compared with decaying capitalism, is clearly revealed to both friends and foes, needs no foreign wars for the purpose of drawing the masses of toilers over to the side of proletarian revolution.

The movement to revolution by the broad masses of the toilers in the capitalist countries in the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism, which will bring ruin to the bourgeoisie in the event of a world war, is serving to assist in postponing military adventures. The bourgeois press in all countries are trying to persuade the masses that "war fears are exaggerated", and are arguing that, just as before the 1914 war, nobody ever mentioned war, so now, on the other hand, there is a constant "noise" about the war danger, but there is no war. With sophism of this kind, the bourgeois maledictors try to hide from the masses that the war incendiaries have still not been able to finish their plans, because the struggle of the Soviet Union for peace helps the working class everywhere to discover the chief hotbeds of war, the growing danger of war in their own countries, and to mobilize their forces for a revolutionary struggle in a broad united front against war and fascism.

In these circumstances, when the distraught bourgeois robbers, despite the efforts of the U.S.S.R. and the international proletariat, are capable any day of hurling themselves against the Soviet Union, the "anti-war" policy of the official leaders of the Social-Democratic Parties and the reformist trade unions who actually cover up the work of military headquarters of their own imperialists, is more than ever dangerous. In the April number of the *Zeitschrift für Socialismus*, the organ of German Social-Democracy, one of the contributors, writing under the pseudonym Kern, expresses the viewpoint of the Prague C.C. of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, and states that "the trend of events of foreign politics has placed the Socialist Parties in a tragic position", and according to him, moreover, "the most tragic position of all" is that of the British Labor Party and the French Socialist Party.

Recognition of their "tragic position" is recognition of the bankruptcy of the Social-Democratic policy in the face of decisive events. And indeed, what can be more tragic than the position of the leadership of the English Labor Party, about which the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 22 wrote, that it "has special grounds for thanking Hitler for his speech", and utters the assurance that "after Hitler's speech, it (*i.e.*, the Labor Party) will insist, with *fresh resolution*, upon the conclusion of a convention on disarmament, along the lines of Hitler's thirteen points".

The position of the leaders of Czech Social-Democracy is also "tragic", when it tries—but without success as the election results have shown—to deceive the workers of Czechoslovakia with downright lying

assertions that "Stalin condemns the policy of the French and Czechoslovakian Communists", and that "it is not the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but Czech Social-Democracy that supports the Soviet Union".

The publicists of the French Social-Democratic organ, the *Populaire*, are also in "tragic" neighborhood with the bourgeois parties, when they demand that in connection with the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Security Pact the French Communist Party should change its position to one of "defending the bourgeois fatherland".

Finally, Kern himself is in the most "tragic" situation, and so is his Prague Committee, which, unwilling to break with the German bourgeoisie, refuses to take the only possible road of struggle against Hitler, the chief inciter to war, namely, that of joint struggle together with the Communists in a broad proletarian front against fascist dictatorship.

The roots of this "tragedy" lie in the fact that Social-Democracy, by adhering to the platform of the defense of the bourgeois fatherland, has inevitably to dance to the tune of its own imperialism, and cannot take the road of consistent revolutionary struggle against war.

The Communists in capitalist countries point out this road to the broad masses, when they convincingly explain the meaning of the Mutual Assistance Pacts concluded between the Soviet Union and France and Czechoslovakia, and the obligations which these pacts put upon the working class of different countries. The Communists of France, Czechoslovakia, England and other countries firmly defend the principles of Bolshevism for the conversion of imperialist war into proletarian war; they determine their *tactics* of struggle against the war danger by concretely estimating the war plans and maneuvers of their own bourgeoisie.

After declaring that the signing of mutual assistance pacts constitutes a new victory for the U.S.S.R. in its struggle for peace, a meeting of Communists and members of the Paris District Committee of the Party passed a resolution "of warm greetings to the great leader, Comrade Stalin, whose wise words about the need for safeguarding peace and safety are valued by the French people".

"Communists," states the resolution, "do not believe that any government of the bourgeoisie can pursue a policy of peace. And since the army can be used against the working class inside the country itself, and to oppress colonial peoples, as well as against the Soviet Union, our Party will continue to protest against the introduction of the two years' term of military service, and against war credits.

"Having firmly decided not to allow any sabotage of the Franco-Soviet agreement by the supporters of war, the Communists call upon the toiling masses of France to rally together in a broad *national front* in order to overthrow the financial projects of the government, which aims at casting the people into still further poverty, and to defend peace and freedom and to prepare for the victory of the great cause of the toilers.

"Long live the unity of the toilers! Long live the Soviet Union, the bulwark of international peace! Long live the French Soviet Republic!"

The London *Daily Worker* writes:

"He [Stalin] applied Lenin's policy, like the great leader he is, and only hypocrites or imbeciles would criticize him for it.

"While utilizing capitalist differences to the utmost, neither the Soviet Union nor any intelligent worker treats this as a permanent or real guarantee of peace or security—which remains the organized strength of the U.S.S.R. and the workers elsewhere. . . .

"The policy of the French (and British) Communists, therefore, remains unaltered, and Stalin's declaration only points the necessity for multiplying all efforts to organize the widest mass front against the war-making imperialists."

It is the practical task of the Communist Parties of all capitalist countries today to strive persistently to develop the united front with Social-Democratic organizations and trade unions for the defense of the U.S.S.R. against the war positions of their own bourgeois governments. The broadest masses must hear the appeal of the Communists:

"We all have one fatherland—the land of proletarian dictatorship. We all have one army—the Red Army. He who raises his hand against the Soviet Union must be destroyed without delay both at the front and the rear."



## Release Comrade Antikainen!

**O**NE of the best sons of the working class of Finland, Communist and fighter against fascism, one of the most beloved leaders of the toiling masses of Finland, Toyvo Antikainen, has been sentenced by the Finnish court to imprisonment for life. But he is menaced by yet another trial which began still earlier. It is still possible for the fascist court of justice to bring in the death sentence against him and to put it into execution. The fascist bourgeoisie of Finland, on whose conscience there are so many bloody victims, intend to murder one of the best leaders of the Finnish proletariat.

It is with pride that Toyvo Antikainen can bear the honored name of proletarian revolutionary. From early youth he has fought in the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat, has traversed a long road of struggle through the Finnish revolution, and participated in the battles of the Russian proletariat, and has reached a leading position in the ranks of the Finnish revolutionary working class movement. After many years of underground work, he fell into the hands of the enemy at the end of 1934—into the hands of the Finnish fascist bourgeoisie—and was brought before their class court. At the trial, Antikainen, the revolutionary, bore the prisoner's jacket with the same pride as the Order of the Red Banner bestowed upon him for deeds of heroism during the Civil War.

Comrade Antikainen is the embodiment of revolutionary heroism for the Finnish workers—regardless of the party to which they belong. A splendid orator with a fiery temperament, a talented organizer of the militant proletariat, a bold, resolute leader of Red troops who broke through the enemies' lines during the Civil War—he is highly esteemed, respected, and loved by the broad masses.

But how deep is the hatred of the bourgeoisie towards him! The ferocious hatred which the Finnish fascists bear towards the Communist Party and especially towards Comrade Antikainen has now expressed itself in howls of joy on the part of the whole of the bourgeois press at his arrest.

Lydin Rask, a non-Party member, who provided Comrade Antikainen with a place of refuge, has been brutally murdered in prison. They wanted to murder Antikainen himself "legally". And so a false criminal charge of murder was brought against him, which murder he was alleged to have perpetrated in Karelia. The fascist bourgeoisie were thirsting for the blood of this Communist.

This plan to murder Antikainen is part of the general offensive of fascism against the toiling people.

The Finnish working class have recovered to a great extent from the blow delivered against them by fascism in 1930. The strike movement which started a year ago has begun to take on ever greater dimensions during recent months. There is a growing desire to fight on the part of the masses of workers. During the last few months, tens of thousands of workers have gained for themselves both higher wages and better conditions of labor. During the last eighteen months, trade union

membership has more than doubled. From day to day the working class is becoming more and more organized and capable of fighting.

The policy of agreement with the present fascist regime and the direct support which is being afforded to it by the Social-Democratic leaders are causing growing dissatisfaction among the adherents of Social-Democracy. Many trade unions have refused to subscribe to the actions of the Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction which voted in favor of the adoption of the fascist emergency laws. Opposition currents are growing up in the ranks of Social-Democracy, which are in favor of the anti-fascist mass struggle and of the united front with the Communists.

The anti-fascist united front, which is already developing in the trade union movement, is gaining more and more ground among the Social-Democratic workers.

This is causing alarm to the Finnish fascist; they are preparing for a new attack upon the toilers. The new fascist campaign is already in full swing; new hard labor laws, new compulsory regulations, new police restrictions directed against the working class are being introduced. In order to extend their mass base, the fascists have organized a chauvinist campaign of slander against the Swedish national minorities. The fascists want to legalize the annihilation of Communists by introducing the death sentence for political crimes.

An accusation of murder has been leveled against Antikainen, so that this brave revolutionary may be executed. The bourgeois press and the prosecutor openly described the plan for Antikainen's execution: his head was to drop from under the axe of the executioner in order to frighten others and prevent them from participating in the revolutionary struggle.

The other purpose of the prosecution was to set the masses of the petty bourgeoisie against the Communists. By means of lying, foul stories about "Communist atrocities", the bourgeoisie made special efforts to arouse the anger and hatred of the peasants against the Soviet system, and to persuade them that despite the fact that their property is sold by auction, and that there is starvation and need in Finland, the peasants nevertheless live better than people do in the Soviet Union.

The trial was used by the fascists for the purpose of *ideological preparation for war against the Soviet Union*: for Comrade Antikainen took part in the Civil War in Russia. According to the indictment, one Finnish whiteguard was killed in Soviet Karelia by Red troops commanded by Antikainen. The foul stories directed against the Red Army were calculated to arouse the petty bourgeoisie against the Red Army and the land of the Soviets. The Finnish whiteguards, who made their way into Soviet Karelia 13 to 14 years ago, were represented as martyrs, fighting for freedom. These bandits who spread death and terror in Soviet Karelia were even referred to as "fighters on behalf of humanity" by the prosecutor. That which the Finnish government has not dared to do, namely, to openly defend these bandits, the official prosecutor has now done.

Through the prosecutor, the fascist government has informed the court that none of Antikainen's witnesses living on the territory of

the U.S.S.R. need be called in. This is the clearest proof that the fascist government has given complete guidance to the "independent", "unbiased" court.

The brave, fearless behavior of Comrade Antikainen in court has won the sympathy of the broad masses. The gross violation of the law, which has been required in order to provide plausible grounds for bringing in the sentence, has called forth tremendous indignation against fascist justice, even in broad petty bourgeois circles. The anti-Soviet slander was to a considerable extent neutralized by Comrade Antikainen's speech, when he declared that the incursion of Finnish whiteguards into Soviet Karelia was a disgrace, and exposed the fascist military plans. With pride and confidence he declared that in the coming war against the Soviet Union, the Finnish workers would fight determinedly against the fascist invaders. By the manly and fighting spirit he displayed during the trial, Comrade Antikainen set an example as to how a proletarian revolutionary should behave before a fascist court. The example he has set is drawing thousands of new, fearless fighters into the ranks of the proletarian, anti-fascist liberation movement.

The trial has not helped to fulfill the fascist plans to introduce capital punishment for political "crimes"; on the contrary, during the trial a broad movement of protest against these plans grew up and embraced not only workers, but petty-bourgeois circles as well, and especially the intellectuals. The movement, a feature of which was mass meetings, countless trade union resolutions, and mass petitions against capital punishment, is the biggest anti-fascist movement in Finland since the fascist coup d'etat in 1930.

The bourgeois court was forced to abandon the death sentence against Antikainen. The movement on Antikainen's behalf both in Finland and abroad, especially in Scandinavia and the United States, smashed the plans of the fascists. Thanks to the international solidarity of the anti-fascist fighters of all countries, we have succeeded in getting Comrade Antikainen out of the executioner's clutches for the time being. The danger, however, is not removed. Antikainen is still in the hands of people who in 1918 killed over 30,000 Finnish workers and peasants, of people who during 1918-22 repeatedly attacked the land of the Soviets, ferociously killing thousands of the toilers of the Soviet Republic, in the hands of people who beat to death in the police dungeons and prisons or shot while "attempting to escape" hundreds of Finnish workers. The life of the proletarian hero, Antikainen, is in danger while he remains in the claws of the fascists who, in their bestial hatred, are capable of anything. Only the release of Antikainen will mean that his life is saved.

*Antikainen must be saved!*

The international proletariat and the anti-fascists who saved the life of Comrade Dimitrov, who are tirelessly fighting for the release of Comrade Thaelmann, will also fight to release Comrade Antikainen. The struggle of the toilers of Finland, supported by the anti-fascist front in all countries, will tear the proletarian hero, Toyvo Antikainen, out of the bloody hands of Finnish fascism.

*Release Comrade Antikainen!*



# The Communist Party of Poland Between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses of the Communist International

(PART I)

By J. LENSKY

THE almost seven years that have passed since the Sixth Comintern Congress represent a period of big successes on the road of the Bolshevization of our Party. The Communist Party of Poland has radically overcome its factional struggle; it has arrived at a situation where it is ideologically and organizationally well knit together, it has closed its ranks around its leadership, it has become steeled in the fire of class battles, it has increased its role as militant vanguard of the proletariat, and has strengthened its influence over the toiling masses.

A correct analysis of the social forces—an analysis of the development of the crisis of capitalism and the growth of the proletarian revolution in Poland—has made it possible for the Party to confront the masses with the direct question of power, to connect it with the everyday experience of the masses, to work out tactical slogans, and to arm the Party organizations for the struggle against deviations from the Bolshevik line.

The Communist Party of Poland has not, however, yet learned to pursue its line consistently and firmly, as the Bolsheviks did; and in its tactics, rapidly to take into account changes in the objective situation, stubbornly to overcome difficulties, and systematically, step by step, to consolidate the positions it wins among the masses.

The greater the demands which the revolutionary movement puts upon us, the more acute is the way in which the most important shortcomings manifest themselves in our practical work, *viz.*, lagging behind the development of events, sometimes being behindhand in initiative, inability to change its methods of work to correspond with the increasing difficulties facing us. The further Bolshevization of the Party implies such an improvement in our system of work as will result in "every step the Party takes, and every action it undertakes leading naturally to the revolutionary education of the masses, to the training of the forces of revolution" (Stalin). The type of Bolshevik Party established by Lenin and Stalin must indeed serve as an example to us.

*What was the position adopted by the Communist Party of Poland as regards the most important questions that defined its line?*

It is sufficient to point out here the attitude of the Party to three problems which faced it after the Sixth Comintern Congress.

In analyzing the economic crisis, we emphasized the fact that it was particularly acute in Poland due to the following causes: the impoverishment of the masses of peasants as a result of the agrarian crisis, the burden of oppressive debts and the weight of militarism, in consequence of the contradictions between the backward forms of peasant economy and the high degree of the centralization of capital, as well as the drive towards cartels accelerated by fascism, in consequence of the relatively weak competitive power of Polish exports.

These causes intensify the development of the special kind of depression. The output of Polish industry is lower than in the majority of other capitalist countries. The peasant market is now also under the pressure of colossal debts and the plunderous taxation which feeds the parasitic war industry. The revival of industry foretold by the government "turned out to be the usual bluff", just like the "radical cutting-down of monopoly prices". The attempts of the Pilsudski-Koslovski government to mitigate the agrarian crisis and to stabilize capitalist economy on a reduced level have failed completely. Koslovski himself was recently forced to admit that the government had not been successful in the slightest degree in closing the gap between industrial and agricultural prices, and that its "restrained optimism in estimating industrial output is damped by the constant impoverishment of the village". The Polish bourgeoisie are trying to keep production at least at the level it is today. The rate at which unemployment has increased this year has exceeded that of 1934, and it should be noted that Poland is one of those countries where there is acute structural unemployment. The economic policy of Polish fascism amounts to "levelling down", which means further robbing the masses of workers and peasants.

In their search for means of improving the economic situation, wide circles among the Pilsudski clique and the Social-Democratic leaders are declaring themselves in favor of "rational" inflation, and consider it to be a way out of the economic blight. While adhering to the official line of deflation, the government in fact resorts to inflation in masked forms, which means a bonus for the industrialists and landlords, resorts to methods connected with preparations for war.

The special kind of depression has not retarded the social changes brought about by the economic crisis. The policy of "levelling down" leads to the working class being utterly pauperized. The wages of the vast masses are at starvation level. The conditions of the skilled workers are becoming rapidly worse. Ever wider sections of the peasantry are becoming pauperized. Approximately one-fourth part of the village population has become proletarianized. The increase in the number of those possessing very little land (about 47 per cent of the farms are tiny) and the impoverishment of the basic masses of the middle peasants is accompanied by an increase in the economic power of the kulaks, in consequence of the government's policy. One can judge of the extent of poverty among the urban petty bourgeoisie by the fact that 60 per cent of the population of Warsaw have not even the minimum income on which to subsist. Over three million people, i.e., almost 10 per cent of

the population of the whole of Poland, not including their families, are without work or any kind of relief whatsoever.

The general crisis of capitalism is developing. Decay, parasitic degeneration and the decline of capitalism are all the more clearly to be seen in Poland the more tremendous the scale of Socialist construction in the Soviet Union. Decaying Polish capitalism cannot tolerate direct neighborhood with growing socialism. This is one of the main causes of the anti-Soviet aggressiveness of Polish imperialism. The victorious realization of the First Five-Year Plan and the victories of the Second have had the effect of an alarm upon the Polish bourgeoisie.

"We have only one thing left to do—to wait", wrote the correspondent of the official *Gazeta Polska*, Janta Polchinski, in his book on the Soviet Union, "for words cannot deny facts. When we see Dnieprostroi, Magnitogorsk and all that is going on there, we are forced to be silent."

Bankrupt Polish capitalism is seeking a way out in war.

*Our analysis has always revealed the overwhelming anti-Soviet tendency in the expansion of Polish imperialism.* Under the influence of this tendency, there has been an extremely complicated development of Polish-German relations in the direction of a rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis. As far back as the Fifth Congress of our Party held in 1930, we did not forget the basic contradictions between Polish and German imperialism, and pointed out that Poland is trying to arrive at an anti-Soviet compromise with Germany. The temporary sharpening of the Polish-German antagonism, immediately following Hitler's advent to power, did not hide from us the fact of the further influence of the anti-Soviet tendency. At that time already we issued a warning against illusions about the Four-Power Pact, and the fact that the Polish government had concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, serving in any way to prevent an agreement between Poland and Germany. The fact that German imperialism forced ahead its attack upon the South of Europe (Austria), and temporarily drew the attention of Germany to a certain extent away from Poland's western frontiers, partially encouraged the Polish-German rapprochement. The joint fighting front of the Hitler and Pilsudski governments was an expression of the partial mitigation of Polish-German contradictions and an attempt to overcome them at the expense of the U.S.S.R. Both fascist governments, which have indissolubly connected the Great Power strivings of their own bourgeoisie with military plans to smash the U.S.S.R. have done all that is humanly possible to bury the Eastern Pact. Both are seeking the support of British imperialism.

"The realism inherent in the English," boasts the *Gazeta Polska*, "demands that they value and respect the bold foreign policy of Marshal Pilsudski, who looks ahead."

Under the protection of the British imperialists, the Polish-German agreement is being converted into an anti-Soviet military alliance, sup-



ported by Japanese imperialism, although the presence of Polish-German contradictions and the successes of the peaceful policy of the Soviet government are causing some wavering even in the ruling camp of the Pilsudski clique, and complicating the establishment of unity in the future, of aggressive action against the U.S.S.R. Secret bargaining is still going on in connection with questions under dispute between the Polish and German governments. But their aims and tasks at the present stage coincide.

The eve-of-war situation is sharpening the political situation in Poland, and giving rise to uncertainty, but at the same time increasing the adventurist tendencies among the bourgeoisie. This is one of the characteristic features of the growth of the revolutionary crisis.

*Our estimation of the revolutionary upsurge* in Poland has taken into consideration the fact that it is of a very uneven character. It was possible to arrive at a correct estimation of the situation only by struggling on two fronts: against the Rights who glossed over the prospects of the situation and against the "Leftists" who simplified the situation. It is characteristic that the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Poland, which liquidated the Right group, first and foremost criticized those who overestimated the situation and emphasized the fact that the struggle of the exploited peasantry was lagging behind the struggle of the proletariat; that the disintegration in the ranks of the enemy parties was going on at a slow pace; that the masses who were leaving Pilsudski's party were being caught up by the opposition parties; and that there was no breakdown in the state apparatus, and especially in the army. The Congress drew special attention to the leadership of everyday struggles, to the need for extending and coordinating them, and making them more political. The immediate prospects pointed out by the Congress, namely, big strike struggles and mass outbursts in the villages, were wholly justified.

The Third Plenum of the C.C. of the Party (in 1931) was in good time in taking into consideration the growing rate at which the revolutionary crisis was ripening. This was the period when the crisis was extremely acute, and when there was a considerable wave of mass battles both in the town and village: the general strikes of the miners, barricades in Yaworzno, the tramwaymen's strikes, mass action on the part of the unemployed, several stubborn conflicts with the police, attempts to disarm the police, to secure the release of arrested men, a strong anti-taxation movement, widespread unrest among government employees, etc. A deep change took place in the sentiments and consciousness of the masses, a change connected with the "more rapid disappearance of the illusions about a peaceful, democratic way out of the crisis".

After noting the presence of a revolutionary upsurge, the Third Plenum drew tactical conclusions from the *strong as well as from the weak sides of the movement*, declared against the lag of the Party behind revolutionary events and against "adventurist tendencies based upon the desire to jump over the present stage of the struggle; against arti-

ficially forcing forward armed action, and against prematurely beginning guerilla warfare, etc." Hence the main stress was laid upon spreading the front of the everyday struggle and on the beginning of mass struggles by the workers and peasants against the attacks of capital: for bread, work, and freedom. Hence our line aiming at a general strike. Hence our slogans which bring the masses into direct conflict with the state apparatus, and confront them with the question of power, and facilitate their passage to higher forms of struggle. Our slogans: "Not a penny in taxes!" "Mass resistance to the police and fascist guards", "No forced labor", and so on, have been proved to be of an actual character by the acute mass battles which have taken place, and which developed to the point of local peasant uprisings in Liske and in Middle Galicia.

In defining the revolutionary prospects, we took as our starting point the tremendous intensity of the political situation not only in Poland but also in Germany. In order not to find ourselves at the tail of events, we prepared the Party for the possibility of sharp changes. The formula adopted at the Twelfth E.C.C.I. Plenum, that "Poland is closely approaching a revolutionary crisis", did not, of course, define the exact date when the crisis would occur. This formula signified a process accompanied by growing difficulties connected with the violent resistance of the bourgeoisie, and was not an automatic jump. The extensive system of fascist terror (punitive expeditions, courts martial) aimed harder and harder blows against our Party and the masses, and the maneuvering tactics of our enemies became more and more flexible, while the efforts which the organization of an extensive struggle on a higher level demanded of us became greater and greater.

The weak spot in our estimation was the fact that at that time we did not sufficiently bear in mind the growing difficulties which gave rise to increasing hesitation on different sections of the revolutionary front. This made it difficult rapidly to adapt our forms of struggle to the new conditions. The Sixth Party Congress (November 1932) made the necessary corrections, when it gave an exhaustive analysis of the difficulties and zigzags of the revolutionary movement which demand more flexibility in our methods of work.

The advent of Hitler to power, and the retreat of the German proletariat, had their effect upon the entire situation in Poland. There began a "Hitlerization" of the mass basis of fascism of all shades, and the fascist regime grew sharper: new vacillations in the direction of fascism arose among the petty bourgeoisie, and primarily in the direction of its opposition wing—national democracy—while the scope of the revolutionary struggle of the Polish proletariat even declined, true, not for long. Bearing in mind the new situation which had arisen, we fought against defeatist, demoralizing moods, against Social-Democratic and Trotskyist forecasts about the whole international labor movement being thrown back for many years to come. The spring strike wave in 1933 refuted all these forecasts, although the defeat of the working class of Germany acted as a brake upon the further spread of the battles of the Polish proletariat.

THE SLOWING DOWN OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN 1934—THE  
NEW PERIOD OF BATTLES AND IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS

The strong side of the revolutionary movement during the year gone by was a series of political protest strikes which developed chiefly on economic ground. The general strike of the textile workers against the abolition of the "Saturday half-day holiday" and social insurance, which occurred in the middle of January, played an enormous role. In the months that followed, there was a wave of strikes which were primarily economic and which covered a still larger number of workers and new branches of industry. Strikes were no less stubborn than hitherto, *but there were no big strike battles*. They were primarily scattered strikes (except the strike of the building workers and the general strike in Pabijanitz) which covered the middle and big industries.

The years of the economic crisis in Poland were marked by a tempestuous rise in the strike movement. During the period between 1931 and 1933, as many workers went on strike annually, on an average, as during the three years taken together when the economic situation was a good one (1927-29). In 1933 (according to official statistics) 342,000 persons and 7,300 factories were involved in strikes. In 1934, 400,000 persons and 11,000 factories were involved.

The peasant movement showed an even greater lack of unity: after the insurgent battles in Middle Galicia, it lost its wide scope and only in Woljin were whole districts seized by anti-tax strikes as previously. The anti-Soviet attacks of bourgeois nationalism caused vacillations in the national liberation movement of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.

These changes cannot, of course, be explained by mere objective reasons. We must also ascertain the influence of subjective factors and primarily the mistakes and weaknesses of the Party. Moreover, we should see the immediate prospects behind passing events and try as quickly as possible to overcome the weak sides of the movement and of our Party work.

The chief reasons for the absence of big strikes during the period from February to December 1934 were as follows:

1. The indirect nature of the offensive of capital: scattered attacks upon wages in separate factories, the gradual and actual abolition of collective agreements without openly breaking them, and the subtle forms of rationalization, etc.

2. The maneuvering tactics of the government, constant "mediation" in conflicts, abolition of social insurance in stages.

3. Our weakness (in spite of individual successes) in the reformist trade unions.

4. The untimely calling of the regional strike on January 24, without thorough preparations being made by the Secretariat of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Poland, and also the irresponsible approach to general strikes in certain districts.

5. The insufficient stress laid upon protest and solidarity strikes which extend the fighting front.



Besides these weaknesses and difficulties, the year 1934 was marked by the following considerable achievements. On the basis of the united front campaign carried out by our Party, the political activity of the proletariat is increasing; the desire for unity of action, which has been put into practice on a wide scale since the beginning of the current year, is growing; the influence of the Party and its everyday contact with the workers, who support the Social-Democratic Parties, is also growing.

Today the capitalists are violating the collective agreements, and striking at whole sections of the working class: textile workers, miners, metal workers, tramwaymen and building workers. Mass activities of the unemployed who are deprived of all assistance are beginning to take place. The increasing abolition of the social and political gains of the proletariat is creating soil for a broad political struggle. The struggle for the united front which we are now pursuing is mobilizing the militant energies of the masses. A period of big strike battles is approaching once again.

A sign of the change is to be found in the general strike of protest of the Dombrov miners and the Lodz textile workers in January of this year. Both strikes were directed against both the capitalists and the government, and were of a political nature. The one-day general strike of the Dombrov miners covered over 80 per cent of the men, and in the Lodz district almost 90 per cent of the workers. A total of 90,000 textile workers went on strike, and were joined in solidarity by the metal workers. All the largest textile mills went completely on strike. One of the chief slogans of both strikes was defense of the trade unions against fascist unification.

Characteristic of the first quarter of this year has been the big wave of strikes reminiscent, by virtue of their size, of the years 1931-33. This year there is a stronger tendency toward coordinated strikes which cover whole branches of industry and whole districts. The main sections of the proletariat are entering on a stubborn struggle, despite the pressure of unemployment which of recent years has reached extreme dimensions. What is new in 1935 is that *economic and political strikes are much more closely interwoven than was the case last year*. The masses of workers are beginning more and more frequently to strike in reply to the repressions of the employers and the police. Strikes in defense of "undesirable" delegates are becoming an everyday occurrence.

The unemployed, among whom fascist demagoguery finds some response, constitute the weakest link in the proletariat front. The breach that exists between the movement of the unemployed and the employed workers, the absence of proper support for the demands of the unemployed on the part of the employed, the fact that the actions of the unemployed are scattered—all this constitutes a menace to the class struggle of the proletariat. Although up to now the employers have not succeeded in making the unemployed their mass reserve from among whom they can draw their "blackleg" forces, nevertheless the unemployed have not been showing such active solidarity as in previous years towards the struggle of the employed workers.

The most important thing now is that our organizations should manifest the maximum initiative and not repeat the mistakes indicated above which help the social reformists to put the brake upon the strike movement. The instructions of the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Poland concerning the combination of various forms of struggle are entirely real today, *viz.*, the combination of political and economic strikes, the seizure of factories, and solidarity strikes and also the struggle of employed workers together with the activities of the unemployed. Having, in the corresponding situation, decided to aim at a general strike throughout the country, it should be remembered that a strike of this kind requires not only that the working class should be in a fighting mood, but that proper preparations are made on the basis of the widespread development of the united front.

The fact that the peasant movement is scattered is to be explained by the following causes:

1. There were punitive expeditions which, besides Western Ukraine and Western White Russia, covered entire localities in Poland itself last year.

2. The policy of the government is more flexible as compared with previous years, expressed in the temporary weakening of the pressure of taxation, thanks to the internal loan, in the postponement of debts, in reductions in taxation, and in promises that there will be a "radical drop in industrial prices".

3. There is an absence of mass, direct, support by the workers for peasant action, especially such as the peasant uprising in Middle Galicia, which the kulak party (*Stronnizwo Ludowe*) used in order to retard the struggle and undermine the alliance between the workers and peasants.

4. There is a growth in the authority and influence of the united party of peasant conciliators (*Stronnizwo Ludowe*) at the same time as the "Left" organizations have been crushed and as our illegal organization has been partially weakened.

5. The Party organizations are divorced to a considerable extent from the peasant masses, and are unable in time to take account of the changes in the moods of the masses, of the new demands advanced by the masses, and also of the processes which are taking place in the peasant party, among the rank and file of the poorest and partially middle peasants; there is a mechanical approach (which does not take account of the situation) to the slogans of struggle against taxation, debts, and starvation; artificial "Leftist" attempts are made to force ahead sharp activities of an adventurist kind, which waste the fighting energies of the masses.

*The immediate prospects*—after a period of the accumulation of forces, accompanied by much greater difficulties among the peasantry than among the proletariat—are those of intense mass battles. The burden of taxation is once more increasing, and the number of anti-taxation outbursts is growing accordingly. The operation of the law concerning reductions in connection with the payment of taxes, which

in itself is actually a weapon to squeeze out debts, will only incense still further the impoverished masses of the peasantry.\* This being the case, we must use flexible tactics. The demands for the every-day struggle put forward by the Communists and the forms in which it manifests itself should correspond to the mood of the masses. While agitating around the slogan, "Not a penny for taxes and debts!" the Communists should *support* every partial demand put forward by the masses, in order to organize the struggle around it against the landlords, the kulaks and fascism (postponement of the payment of debts until the situation is better; abolition of the most oppressive taxes, etc.). It must be remembered that the Party should organize an active boycott of taxation only where the masses are ready and willing to struggle, and the main stress, moreover, should be laid upon the *preparation* of mass resistance to the violent and forcible collection of taxes.

The chief cause for the lack of national liberation struggles on a broad scale in Western Ukraine and Western White Russia is that certain links of our organizations have fallen victims to the pressure of local counter-revolutionary nationalism, which, under the guise of "national defense", has begun a violent campaign of slander against the Soviet Union. The serious vacillations on this basis in the organizations of the C.P.W.U. (Communist Party of Western Ukraine in Polish territory—Ed.) and the C.P.W.W.R. (Communist Party of West White Russia in Polish territory—Ed.) cannot be explained merely by the undermining work of the agents of the class enemy. The roots of these vacillations lie deeper, namely, in the fact that the powers of resistance of both parties are too weak, and are under the especially strong influence of petty bourgeois elements, the influence of bourgeois nationalism. These vacillations were accompanied by the political activities of the Ukrainian and White Russian kulaks who constitute the prop of fascism in its struggle against the revolutionary movement and in its preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. These vacillations revealed the fact that we did not in our every-day practical work fight enough against nationalism, while the agents of the class enemy, on their part, retarded this struggle. The crushing of the provocateur nationalist agencies, the overcoming of the crisis in the C.P.W.U. and the confusion in the C.P.W.W.R. are providing the chief premise for a new rise of the national liberation struggle against the occupation of Polish imperialism.

The question of nationalism is also very acute among the toiling masses of Poland.

Despite the consistent internationalism of the Communist Party of Poland, a number of Party organizations have not waged a systematic, persistent struggle against nationalism in all its varieties.

The most characteristic example is that of our Upper Silesian organ-

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\* Agricultural indebtedness has reached 45 billion zlotys. The total payments on debts with interest amount to 1,750 million zlotys this year, while the total income does not exceed one and a half billion zlotys. Hence the attempts of the government to make the payment of debts a "real" thing, by granting partial cancellation of debts to those peasants who regularly pay their debts according to the stipulated rate. The government has promised to assign a total of only 300 million zlotys for doubtful operation, i.e., an operation which is beyond the powers of the peasant masses.



ization, which, in consequence of its passivity in the struggle against Polish and German nationalism, began to retrogress. The Young Communist League also displays an underestimation of the danger of nationalism in its work, at a time when nationalist ideology is penetrating by diverse routes into the ranks of the young workers and peasants. The Polish fascists skillfully combine nationalism and social demagoguery. The Pilsudski clique decorates nationalism in the most radical, almost revolutionary colors, combining the idea of great power superiority with demagogic slogans like the "state of labor", "planned economy", etc. In order to fight against all this, mass educational work in the spirit of proletarian internationalism must be carried on systematically; there must be an ideological and political offensive against all the positions of bourgeois nationalism. Unless such an offensive is undertaken, it will be impossible to fight successfully against imperialist war and in defense of the U.S.S.R.

A stubborn struggle against nationalism is an essential condition if we are to draw the petty bourgeois masses away from fascism. Despite the fact that these masses are moving Leftwards, they constitute a reservoir from which the ruling fascist clique as well as the oppositional fascists draw their forces. Our work among the urban petty bourgeoisie chiefly covers the Jewish masses. The Communist Party has important influence only among the Jewish petty bourgeoisie. The masses of the Polish petty bourgeoisie, among whom Great Power chauvinism and pogrom anti-Semitism has been deeply imbued, primarily constitute the sphere of influence of the Pilsudski clique and national democracy. Broad strata of the intellectuals and government employees are hardly touched at all by our influence. The absence of systematic work on the part of the Communist Party gives the opportunity to national democracy to broaden its base even among the impoverished masses of the petty bourgeoisie who are swinging to the Left. And yet poverty, starvation, taxation, terror and police license—all give big opportunities to the Communists to influence the basic masses of the urban petty bourgeoisie.

The ever intensifying disintegration in the camp of the bourgeoisie helps us to win over the sympathy of the petty bourgeois poor in favor of the revolution. Our Party has learned how to give a correct estimate of this disintegration, correctly to analyze it. But the Party has not been able to use properly the internal struggle among the bourgeoisie in order to undermine the fascist dictatorship, and to expose fascism in the eyes of the workers as well as in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie. The Party must get into every crack, must use every conflict between the hostile factions in the bourgeois camp, every crack in the mass fascist organizations. The more stubbornly the fascist government tries to create its own base, the more energetically the oppositional fascists work to win the masses who leave the Pilsudski clique, the more active must the Communist Party become.

The process of disintegration inside the bourgeois camp is extremely varied. The Polish bourgeoisie are displaying considerable ability to maneuver in consolidating their mass base. They are trying to secure

a hold over the masses who are leaving their organizations, by drawing them into other bourgeois organizations or renewing the old organizational forms. This policy of reinsurance still meets with success. The changes that are taking place inside the mass base of fascism are, in the main, to the advantage of national democracy. But the growth of the mass base of the oppositional fascists at the expense of the ruling fascists clique will not lead—in itself—to the automatic replacement of the Pilsudski clique by the national democrats at the helm of the State, the more so since the Pilsudski clique have the confidence of monopoly capital and have the State apparatus at their disposal, are maneuvering skillfully with the help of their points of support among the masses, and are undermining the organizations of their rivals. We may speak of a considerable contraction of the mass base of the Pilsudski clique, who, when necessary, bedeck their organizations in new colors, and in some places establish new organizations, but we cannot as yet speak of the complete breakdown of the mass basis of this clique.

Among the petty bourgeois followers of Pilsudski, hidden dissatisfaction is developing into open action against their leaders, into open resistance which recently led to the closing down of the Warsaw organization of the "Labor" Party. If one of the most popular leaders of the Pilsudski "opposition", Phillipovich, was able to declare that "the generation that built up Poland is now bankrupt", then it is evident that the *process of disintegration* in the Pilsudski camp has gone deep down, and has reached its very foundations. And what can be said of the masses of the Pilsudski youth, organized in the "Legion of Youth", in the "Young Village Union", and so on, where, besides coquetting at opposition, considerable strata, who see no way out for themselves under the capitalist order, are moving Leftwards.

Along with the sharpened friction among the bourgeoisie, there are ever more frequent attempts to bring about a compromise from within. On this basis a section of the younger cadres of national democracy who advocate the "totality of the Polish people against the class struggle" have come close to the Pilsudski clique. On the other hand, in the fast demoralizing "non-Party bloc" (in the ruling party), two wings are being formed, which the government wants to use for the purpose of consolidating its forces under the leadership of the Pilsudski clique. The "Left" wing is flirting with the kulak "people's party" and with the Polish Socialist Party, the Right, with national democratic elements.

At the same time the ruling fascists are trying to compensate for the fact that their mass base is contracting by a further concentration of their power and by increasing the pressure of the state apparatus upon the toiling masses. In the course of its development the Polish variety of fascist dictatorship continues to follow the Hitler example. The events of June 30 temporarily frightened the Polish fascists away from openly imitating Hitlerism. The revision of the Constitution was delayed under their direct influence. However, a few months later it was again brought forward. The new Constitution subordinates all the organs of power to the President, the Seim being maintained formally. The

electoral legislation guarantees an overwhelming majority to the ruling party. *The new Constitution means the further Hitlerization not only for the State apparatus, but of the whole of social life.* This Constitution is a big step in the direction of developing the fascist system, and at the same time is an instrument of war in the hands of the Pilsudski clique, whose representative—the President of the State—“decides questions of war or peace”.

This policy which guarantees the monopoly to one fascist party is directed first and foremost against the working class movement. The government may, to a certain, though more limited, extent, permit the existence of rival parties as auxiliary forces in the struggle against the revolutionary movement; it may even make a partial re-grouping in the state apparatus, within the limits of a compromise. But at the same time Polish fascism will persistently strive to smash the legal mass organizations that are, or may become, a weapon of the proletarian class struggle. At the present moment, when the fascist dictatorship is speeding up its own development in the direction of “totality”, one must also reckon with the possibility of heavy blows being directed against the system of opposition parties.

The Pilsudski government in 1930 had already planned for the fascist unification of the trade unions. To realize its monopoly, Polish fascism had to display extreme caution in consequence of the weakness of its own organizations among the working class and the bankruptcy of the government “labor” party. Long preparations were required before the planned unification could be made. While maintaining the reformist trade unions, the bureaucracy of which encouraged the policy of arbitration, the Pilsudski government began to set up its own trade unions, first and foremost in the state and munitions industries.

For a long time there has existed in our Party an underestimation of the new attempts of fascism to create a base among the working class, directly connected with fascism. These attempts met with partial success. The Pilsudski clique have been successful by means of violence, deception, privileges in the sphere of labor and the bribery of a limited group of the workers, who form the cadres of the fascist trade union bureaucracy, in creating a network of trade unions in several branches of industry. With all their instability, the fascist trade unions, which are based upon the state apparatus, can become points of support for “unification”. Only the determined resistance of the toiling masses can smash the plans of the fascist dictatorship.

The growth of this resistance can be seen if only in the “Left” maneuvers of the government, which is now advocating closer contact with the “common people” and love for the “plain man”, as well as all talking about a Left turn in the Pilsudski press, connected also with feverish preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. Witness to the growth of revolutionary resistance may be found in the violent terror against the masses who are swinging to the Left. Proof of the growth of this resistance is to be found in the growing influence of the Communist Party which has become a political factor of first-class importance. It



was not for nothing that the fascist Minister of Home Affairs, in his report to the Seim in 1934, assured the bourgeoisie that the police and secret police had done everything within their power to suppress Communism, that "in the sphere of struggle against the Communist movement, methods and means which aimed to paralyze its development had been adopted", that "repression had been used towards the central and local institutions of the Communist Party throughout the whole of Poland". The old, tried method in the hands of the Polish bourgeoisie, enriched by many years of experience of tsarism, is provocation. Big successes in the struggle against provocation do not in the least signify that the danger is any the less or that the vigilance of the Party has increased as it should. To calm oneself or to assert that the Party has fully coped with this task would be foolishness. The stronger the pressure from the provocateurs, the more stubborn should the struggle against them be in all links of the Party.

What are the main prospects?

*The revolutionary crisis in Poland continues to grow*, although the process itself is uneven, and proceeds in a zigzag manner. The certain increase of production achieved by the bourgeoisie at the expense of the bulk of the proletariat and peasantry, who are subjected to rapacious exploitation, to severe terror, only accelerates the speed at which the explosives are accumulated for the revolution. *Poland remains one of the weakest links in the capitalist system.*

The revolutionary movement in Poland is fraught with sharp changes and "unexpected" outbursts.

"The conviction is current everywhere", wrote the government paper, the *Courier Poranny*, recently, "that every one of the larger outbursts may let loose social forces which will find a leadership for themselves."

A big role in the approach of the revolutionary crisis is played by the war policy of Polish fascism, which deepens the hatred of the masses towards the government of hunger, terror and war. The anti-Soviet alliance with fascist Germany has called forth deep indignation among the masses.

"And the more the bourgeoisie becomes entangled in its war combinations, the more frequently it resorts to terroristic methods in the struggle against the working class and the toiling peasantry, the sooner will the revolutionary crisis mature." (Stalin, *Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.*)

(To be Continued.)

# Regarding Some Questions of Agrarian Work in the U. S. A.

By W. SHERMAN

**I**N a letter sent to the *Farmers' National Weekly*, a copy of which he sent to us, Comrade Bruce Taylor, an active participant in the farmers' movement in Minnesota, raised a number of important questions regarding the work of the Party in the U.S.A. among the farmers. It is to be welcomed that such a comrade should critically examine the tactical line of the Party and its approach to the task of winning over the poor and middle farmers as allies of the proletariat. This is especially timely because the agrarian work of the Party has received altogether inadequate discussion in the Party press. Comrade Taylor points out some of the shortcomings, weaknesses and sectarian tendencies in the agrarian work of the Party, which are the main reasons for our lagging behind in our work among the farmers.

We can well ask the question: How does it happen, that after many years of a protracted agrarian crisis in the United States, intensified by the economic crisis, the Party has not made any serious headway in the task of penetrating the ranks of the poor and middle farmers? It is, firstly, due to the fact that the Party has until recently seriously underestimated the importance of winning the poor farmers on the side of the proletariat. Secondly, for a long time the Party did not have a clearly differentiated approach to the various strata of the farm population. It was only at the Extraordinary Party Conference in July, 1933, that the tasks of the Party were for the first time clearly formulated in a resolution which declared that the Party must base its work in the countryside on the agricultural laborers and upon the poor farmers as the most reliable, the firmest ally of the proletariat; that it must win over as allies the lower strata, and neutralize the rest of the middle farmers; that it must engage in uncompromising struggle against the rich farmers, the landlords and all the other exploiters of the village poor. It was on the basis of this correct approach that the Party was able to achieve some successes, which are, however, small in comparison with the great tasks and possibilities which the objective situation opens before us.

The serious lagging behind of the Party in its agrarian work, and the continued underestimation by the Party organizations and the Party press of the importance of winning the support of the poor and middle farmers and in strengthening the Party organization and influence in the countryside, was glaringly reflected for the past year in the failure to develop any real mass struggles around the burning issue of drought relief, and in the weak campaign in support of the Farmers' Emergency Relief Bill since it was introduced into Congress. At the same time, little or no attention was paid to orientating the Party toward the new

developments in the agricultural situation, which required a review and adjustment of our tactics to a new situation.

The Roosevelt farm program has resulted in the further wholesale impoverishment of the poor farmers and sections of the middle farmers. The program of "regulated" inflation, crop reduction and livestock destruction has had a disastrous effect (further aggravated and intensified by the drought) on the most exploited sections of the rural population, while directly benefiting the rich farmers, landlords, mortgage-holders, insurance companies, and banks. The latest government statistics give some small indication of this: farm-tenancy has increased to nearly half of the farm population; the sharecroppers of the South are reduced to ever greater starvation and are being evicted from their homes as a result of the cotton curtailment program; the price increases of the things the farmers buy are considerably higher than many price increases of the farm products they sell; and the 34 per cent increase in food prices for the city worker, accompanied by reduction of wage earnings for the employed and of relief for the unemployed, considerably reduces the consumption of farm products. In these circumstances, the hopes and illusions of the impoverished farmers in the Roosevelt program, nurtured by the bourgeois-reformist leaders of the farm organizations, have been seriously weakened, although not entirely overcome.

If big mass struggles of the farmers have not yet been developed today, even to the level of two or three years ago, it is partly to be explained by the fact that the form of the sharp capitalist offensive against the rural toilers has been to a certain extent modified, though by no means lessened. Mass resistance of the farmers threatened with the loss of their farm and the rapid spread of "penny sales" made it no longer advisable for a certain period to carry through these evictions and foreclosures, nor was it profitable for the mortgage-holders to do so, when the government offered to take over the defunct mortgages. Then the government subsidies for acreage reduction, which of course benefited mainly the rich farmers, landlords and the banks, also had a certain influence on the upper layers of the middle farmers. For the vast majority of the poor and middle farmers, this program meant greater impoverishment and destitution. Thus the reformist leaders were able to some extent to divert for the time being the mass discontent on the countryside against the Roosevelt program of monopoly capital, and strenuously worked to keep this discontent from breaking out into mass struggles. But in order to accomplish this, it was necessary to even make some concessions to the impoverished farmers, however inadequate, in the form of appropriations by the Federal Government and several state governments for drought relief, feed, seed, etc. But the ferment increases, and forces the leaders of the Farmers' Union, Farm Holiday Association and the Farmer-Labor Party to utilize more "Left" demagoguery, and even to come out in sharp criticism of the "New Deal" policies and to flirt with the idea of a third party movement.

It would be wrong to draw the conclusion that the objective factors have precluded the possibilities of developing big struggles against the



Roosevelt farm program (Agricultural Administration Act, Bankhead Act, etc.). Never were there bigger opportunities for organizing a united front of struggle of the impoverished farmers for immediate relief. The Party has had some initial successes in developing such a united front on various issues of relief, and in support of the Farmers' Emergency Relief Bill which has been drawn up at the initiative of the Party, endorsed by a number of militant farm organizations, and introduced into Congress. But there are some serious weaknesses and shortcomings in the work of the Party and the militant farm organizations. The sectarian tendencies in our agrarian work seriously hinder the development of struggles on a broad united front basis.

Comrade Taylor, in a letter to the editor of the *Farmers' National Weekly* (a copy of which he sent to us) complains that the Party does not in the agrarian work

"... understand the basic principles of the united front or how properly to make the approach, or the function of the U. F. L. in the united front after it has been initiated. The mass organization, the U.F.L. and others, is one and the same thing as the Communist Party; it has no identity as a separate organization apart from the Party, with a program of its own and a function of its own to perform. This lack of comprehension and confusion is apparent all of the time in the *Farmers' National Weekly*."

If we examine the United Farmers' League, however, we see that it is still a small, narrow organization which has not been able to penetrate the broad masses of the poor and middle farmers, and which in its approach to the farm masses is very often indistinguishable from the Communist Party. At its National Convention in June, 1934, an attempt was made to formulate a program which makes clear that the United Farmers' League is a much broader organization than the Party, but this program was never popularized, and the approach and methods of work of the Communists in the U.F.L. remained essentially the same, thus tending to limit the organization to only the most advanced elements among the farmers, those who are more or less in sympathy with the Communist Party.

Considering the fact that the great mass of the farmers belong to the various big farm organizations, under bourgeois reformist leadership, the question of developing the united front acquires the greatest importance for the Party, the United Farmers' League and other militant farm organizations.

The first beginnings of united front actions were made by the Party and the United Farmers' League in the first Farmers' National Conference at Washington, D. C., in December, 1932, out of which was born the Farmers' National Committee for Action, under whose auspices was held a still broader united front conference at Chicago in November, 1933. Into this united front were drawn many of the lower organizations of the Farmers' Union and the Farm Holiday Association. But unfor-

tunately, this was not followed up enough to broaden the base for joint actions. The Farmers' National Committee for Action was not sufficiently utilized as an instrument to penetrate the reformist organizations, and to draw them into the united front of struggle for the most immediate needs of the impoverished farmers, and in fact has functioned only spasmodically, at times losing its identity. The Communists who participated in this united front movement did not always display a sufficient understanding of the difference between the role of the United Farmers' League, an organization of the more advanced elements with a class struggle program, and the role of the Farmers' National Committee for Action, a united front body which unites for action all poor and middle farmers and their organizations, regardless of political differences, on a program of the most vital immediate demands. This shortcoming is evident in the militant farmers' press, the *Farmers' National Weekly* and the *Producers' News*. It was also evident in the confusion that existed for a long time in regard to the establishment of local farmers' committees of action; the establishment of these local organs of united struggle, on a temporary basis, to include the United Farmers' League, the reformist farm organizations, and the unorganized farmers, was at times narrowed down so that the committees of action (or rather the most active elements in them) were transformed into locals of the United Farmers' League. The local committee of action was not sufficiently understood to be an elected body representing the broad mass of the poor and middle farmers of all tendencies, leading in united front actions around some specific issues.

Millions of exploited farmers are members of farm organizations and cooperatives under openly reactionary or reformist leadership. There is a growing gap between the militant sentiments of the rank and file of these organizations and their leaders, and even the "Left" reformists are finding it increasingly difficult to cover up their bourgeois policies with radical phraseology; and what is especially important, the leading committees of the lower organizational units in townships and counties, and even to some extent in the state organizations, are often susceptible to pressure from below; many of the honest elements leading the lower organizations can be won for a class struggle policy, for the united front. If the Party is to win the masses of poor and middle farmers who are the majority in these organizations to a policy of class struggle, and away from the treacherous policies of their leaders, it is becoming an ever more urgent necessity for the Communists and other militant elements to enter these organizations and give leadership to the mass discontent of the membership and direct it into channels of struggle against the bourgeoisie. Without this, the development of a broad united front movement cannot be accomplished, and the winning of the impoverished rural masses as allies of the proletariat, fighting under the leadership of the proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard, the Communist Party, is impossible. This turn must be made, at the same time continuing the task of organizing the unorganized farmers under militant leadership, where this is possible and in accordance with the concrete situation.

Whether we should organize them into the United Farmers' League, or into the Farmers' Holiday Association or Farmers' Union or some other farmers' organization will depend on the concrete situation in each locality. Where such an organization as the Farmers' Holiday Association, in spite of its bourgeois reformist leadership, is a mass organization in a certain locality or has the possibility of becoming a mass organization, the Communists should not hesitate to participate in the organization of the farmers into this organization and for the establishment of militant leadership in the local and state organizations. The importance of such a turn can be seen from the experiences in Nebraska in 1933, where by entering the movement when the masses were in revolt against the top Farm Holiday leaders, national and state, the militant elements under the leadership of the Farmers' National Committee for Action succeeded in taking over the leadership of the Nebraska Holiday Association which at that time numbered nearly 30,000 members.

Without overlooking the advances made by the Party in the agrarian field recently (Sioux Falls united front conference, etc.), it is necessary to say that we are still seriously lagging behind and have not yet overcome the sectarian tendencies which are hindrances in our work. We can therefore only welcome the criticism of comrades who keenly feel these shortcomings in the course of their daily work among the masses. But Communists are not separated by a Chinese wall from the masses, and are therefore subject to becoming influenced themselves, if not vigilant, by the reformist illusions. Therefore, if the correct criticism of the Party's weaknesses and shortcomings, and particularly of sectarian tendencies in the Party's agrarian work, is to have any value, it is necessary to exercise the utmost care that we do not go to the opposite, and equally dangerous, extreme, that of surrendering to the Right opportunist tendencies which may lead to the camp of social reformism. The struggle must be conducted on two fronts, against both Right and "Left" opportunism. Unless this is done, such criticism can only result in such errors as are evident in the letter of Comrade Taylor.

In his letter we find the following:

"As the *Farmers' National Weekly* is a united front paper, official organ of several other farm organizations which are non-political, it should not play up the C.P. except on'y in connection with other political parties or as a matter of reporting legitimate news. Our enemies use this to prejudice the backward groups against us by calling the U.F.L. and other organizations 'Red', so in many cases it is not the contents of the article so much as its obvious color and tone, which I criticize."

He says further that the editorial policy of the *Farmers' National Weekly* and the leadership of the United Farmers' League

"... are orientated on the program and line of the Communist Party and follow it instead of the program and line of the U.F.L., thereby making the F.N.W. an organ of the Communist Party rather than what it should be as the official organ of the



United Farmers' League. The editors of the F.N.W. must re-orientate themselves on the program of the U.F.L. and understand that the U.F.L. is not the Party, and performs an entirely different function than the Party, and that these functions are not interchangeable."

Comrade Taylor approaches the question as though there is no connection between the struggle for immediate demands and the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of capitalism; and he therefore sees a contradiction in Communists following the line of the Party while giving effective leadership to a broad mass organization which fights for some immediate demands. That is why there is repeated so often in his letter the phrase "non-political" in characterizing the role of a mass organization. It is necessary to understand that the smallest struggle for the most elementary immediate demand is essentially a political struggle, and is the most important link in bringing the workers and farmers step by step to higher political stages, to the revolutionary struggle against capitalism. The bourgeoisie and their reformist agents raise the argument about keeping the workers' and farmers' organizations "out of politics", but what they mean actually is to keep them from the class struggle, from working class politics, because under cover of this "non-political" approach they participate very actively in politics, in bourgeois politics, and attempt to get the support of the masses for the political parties which support capitalism. Communists cannot approach any question "without political bias"; it is a class approach, which is necessarily politically biased, and only in this way can the politically backward masses be made class conscious and their political understanding developed. There is no contradiction between following the line of the Communist Party and adopting a correct approach to leading the masses in a struggle for their economic demands; in fact, only by a correct application of the strategy and tactics of the Party can effective leadership be given in these struggles.

But this is in no way contradictory to the most urgent immediate task: to build a broad united front of struggle embracing the widest masses of rural toilers, with the Communists as the driving force. Without hiding the face of the Party and its program, or the role of the Communists within the broader movement, it must be the Communists' aim not to narrow down such a movement to only Communists and its close sympathizers. That such tendencies exist there is no doubt. The Party must make a most determined effort to liquidate these sectarian tendencies which are the greatest obstacle in the development of a mass movement among the farmers. Comrade Taylor also points out that "another criticism of the F.N.W. is that the articles written by the editorial staff show a woeful unfamiliarity with farming in general, which accounts for their inability to talk the language of the farmers". Certainly the *Farmers' National Weekly*, although improving, has many shortcomings to overcome before it will be a popular mass organ with a wide appeal for the toiling farmers, no matter how politically backward. It does not yet speak a language which the farmers understand,

it very often uses a phraseology which may be suitable for the most advanced class conscious elements, but not for the broad masses. And it does not yet raise as a central political question the development of the united front of struggle of the impoverished farmers, as the most burning need of today. While developing the united front in a bold and energetic manner, it is necessary at the same time to change our methods of criticizing the Roosevelt program, the reformist leaders, semi-fascists and demagogues like Coughlin and Long (whom Milo Reno, Farm Holiday leader, is trying to sell to the farmers) by repetition of well known formulas, and instead to use clear, convincing arguments by which we concretely expose these leaders and their demagoguery before the masses and dispel the illusions in them, at the same time showing up the ideological platform on which they stand, by which they are linked to the policies of the bourgeoisie.

That is why it is wrong to argue, as Comrade Taylor does, that we can criticize Governor Olson without linking him to the petty bourgeois Farmer-Labor Party. We must show the masses the contents of its ideological platform, and its support of the capitalist class, even though clearly differentiating it, however, from the masses in the Farmer-Labor Party who want to struggle against the bourgeoisie. This exposure must be skillful, showing the masses the contrast between their own anti-capitalist sentiments and the path their leaders are diverting them to; if we do not do this, we will only strengthen the reformist illusions of the masses and encourage the penetration of these illusions in the ranks of the Party; in fact, such opportunist tendencies have already appeared during the last election campaign in the Party in Minnesota, the state where the Farmer-Labor Party is in power, precisely because there was an insufficient ideological struggle against the platform of the Farmer-Labor Party, in contrast with the Communist platform. (The question of our tactics in relation to the Farmer-Labor Party, as part of our Labor Party tactics, will be discussed in a separate article.)

The whole Party must change its attitude to the agrarian question, and give the most serious attention to the establishment of a firm Party base among the most exploited sections of the farm population. We must make strenuous efforts to build the Party in the most important agricultural states of the Midwest, among the poorest strata of the farmers and the agricultural laborers, and among the sharecroppers of the South, if we are to take seriously the task of developing a mass movement based on the most reliable strata of the rural allies of the proletariat. Connected with this is the problem of developing cadres who are familiar with the problems of the farmers and connected with the mass organizations of the farmers, and who will have at the same time a correct political approach to the tasks of the Party and the problems it must solve in this field. One of the chief shortcomings of many of the leading cadres of the Party in agrarian work is their disconnection from the life and problems of the farm masses, which only leads to a sectarian approach to the problems. While our comrades have correctly

carried on a struggle against Right opportunist tendencies wherever they have appeared, it must be said that they have not carried on the same struggle against sectarianism, and at times the fear of committing opportunist mistakes led to further sectarian isolation (for instance, the first reaction of the *Producers' News* to the farmers' strike for higher prices was a negative one, and there was some hesitancy in changing this attitude). The point mentioned by Comrade Taylor about the language spoken by the *Farmers' National Weekly* not being understood by the masses is also connected with the question of developing cadres who are able to speak the language of the masses, to popularize our mass agitation and propaganda among the farmers in accordance with the needs of the present situation.

Finally, it is necessary to popularize widely the slogan of Soviet Power among the poor farming masses, explaining in concrete terms what a Soviet America would mean for them, popularizing the achievements of collectivized agriculture in the Soviet Union, bringing forward the program of the Communist Party before the broadest masses of the village poor who are engaged in struggle for their immediate demands to develop their political consciousness so that they fully understand that only by allying themselves with, and placing themselves under, the leadership of the proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard can they hope to free themselves from the yoke of capitalism.

The questions raised by Comrade Taylor show the great need in the Party for a greater clarification of the political questions connected with our work among the farmers. It is to be hoped that the raising of these questions will stimulate the beginning of a more thorough discussion in the Party press on the problems of our agrarian work.



# The Communist Party of Italy Must Come Out of Its Deep Underground Position

By K. RONCOLI

**I**N the Tribune for the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (*Communist International*, Vol. XI, No. 24, 1934), Comrade Tunelli published an article entitled "The Nature and the Sources of Sectarianism in the Communist Party of Italy". In this article he enters into a polemic "against certain methodological mistakes", and also against other mistakes of a more serious political nature which, in the opinion of this comrade, were made in my article entitled "Basic Lessons of the Struggle of the Communist Party of Italy Against Fascism Under the Conditions of the Totalized Regime" (published in the "Tribune of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern", *Communist International*, Vol. XI, No. 22, 1934).

I did not have the opportunity—within the framework of my previous article—of deepening my analysis of the nature and sources of sectarianism in the Italian Communist Party. It is undoubtedly true that it would be very useful and interesting to make a serious, profound study of the environment in which this sectarianism arose, a study of the forces which affected it, on the one hand, of the long and stubborn pressure of fascism, on the other, the influence of non-Marxist ideology, extensively propagated for several decades among the proletariat and the Socialist Party.

Unfortunately, there is nothing of the kind to be found in Comrade Tunelli's article. In the main, his article is devoted not to the main actual problem which is of serious political importance, but to questions which at a first glance, at any rate, are more of a scholastic and bookish nature.

Because of this, I shall not dwell in order upon the questions raised by Comrade Tunelli, but will first and foremost, and in particular, deal with a question which Comrade Tunelli touches upon only slightly in the second part of his article, but which in my opinion today assumes the most acute significance for the Communist Party of Italy.

## TO DEVELOP THE MASS STRUGGLE AND USE ALL EXISTING LEGAL POSSIBILITIES

1. In connection with all the facts and ideas set forth in my article, I wrote:

"The work of the Party and the mass actions connected with it developed in breadth, in *quantity*, but their *type*, their character, did not change to such a great extent as to lead to a decisive change in the relationship of forces between fascism and the

working class (to force fascism to undertake more extensive maneuvers and thus make it possible for the Party of the working class to come out from underground conditions to which it has been doomed for many years)." (Page 859, No. 22.)

And Comrade Tunelli comments:

"From the words quoted in parenthesis, it is plain that Comrade Roncoli is replacing the revolutionary task of breaking through fascist legality by means of mass struggle, a revolutionary task which may become urgent tomorrow in Italy, by the problematic task of exerting such pressure on the fascist regime as will compel it to undertake 'maneuvers on a big scale' such as will give our Party the chance of becoming a legal Party in Italy in the conditions of the fascist regime. In other words, fascism, under pressure from us, is to agree to the legalization of the Communist Party. This prospect is a very unlikely one, and can only weaken the will of the masses to undertake revolutionary struggle to break through fascist legality, and in the last analysis to overthrow the fascist power." (Page 981, No. 24.)

The theses of the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. also formulate the tasks of the Italian Communist Party in the near future:

*"The Communist Party of Italy must come out from underground [my italics—K.P.] by developing the mass struggle against the fascist dictatorship on the basis of the defense of the everyday interests of the toilers, taking advantage of fascist meetings, organizing impromptu meetings in the factories, penetrating into the fascist trade unions and cultural and cooperative organizations, preparing and carrying on strikes and demonstrations. Mass illegal work must be increased to the maximum extent."* (Theses, Twelfth E.C.C.I. Plenum.)

Thus, the Theses of the Twelfth Plenum—a source far more authoritative than my article—set the Communist Party of Italy at a much earlier period the urgent task of coming out of its deep underground position by developing the mass struggle and using all existing legal possibilities. How should this resolution of the Plenum be interpreted, and how should the part of my article cited above be interpreted? More precisely: as a result of what processes could the Communist Party of Italy come out of the deep underground position in which it is today?

There are some comrades, and I think that Comrade Tunelli is one of them, who think that the Communist Party and together with it the whole of the working class movement in Italy, can come out of their present position of deep illegality only as a result of a decree of the fascist government, which would legalize them juridically, or as a result of an uprising. Since an uprising in Italy is not a direct task and since the chance of the Communist Party becoming legal (*i.e.*, tolerated by law) is a very unlikely one, we may draw the conclusion that all that remains for the Party to do at present is to reconcile itself to the deep underground position to which it has been doomed already for several years.

These comrades fail to understand that there is a third prospect—a *direct* prospect—as it were. They do not understand that it is precisely by using all existing legal possibilities, that the workers—at a definite stage of the development of the movement—can, by weight of numbers, push aside, *break through* the framework of that legality even before the uprising and, maybe, long before it. The working class movement and the Communist Party can in actual practice withdraw itself from its position deep underground, *quite independent of whether the letter of the law is changed or not*, as the result of changes in the relation of forces between the working class and fascism, and also by making use, in the interests of the toilers, of all those maneuvers to which fascism will be compelled to resort in consequence of these changes in the relation of forces inside the country.

If the comrades are convinced that the Party can come out of its position deep underground only by force of a decree (a decree issued by Mussolini, or by the revolutionary government which will arise as the result of an uprising), this means that they look upon legality and illegality, if one may say so, from a lawyer's point of view. These comrades do not understand that in practice there can exist, and in certain cases does exist, actual legality which does not at all coincide with the legality according to civil law, *i.e.*, with legality established by some written law, and that the bounds of actual legality of this kind depend exclusively upon the relationship of class forces which exist in the given place and at the given time.

But if this principle is not understood, it is clear that the task facing our Party "of coming out of its position deep underground, where it is today" loses all its meaning.

The failure to understand all the actual processes thanks to which the working class movement and, consequently, the Party of the proletariat will be able to come out of its position deep underground, where it has been driven by the enemy, will inevitably lead to the struggle against fascism being looked upon merely as a frontal attack, as a struggle on behalf of the uprising, and to the most vulgar adaptation of the movement to fascism, namely, capitulation to fascism. At bottom, the consequence of both these positions can only be passivity, denial of the everyday, stubborn struggle to change the existing relation of forces between fascism and the masses of the working class.

By their terrorist policy and "totalitarianism", the fascists long ago succeeded in driving the working class movement and the Communist Party of Italy down into a position very deep underground. For long years the Party has actually reconciled itself to this state of affairs, limiting itself to work only in the extremely narrow framework to which it was doomed by the enemy.

It was very late, unfortunately, before the Communist Party on the basis of its own experiences and of a deep analysis of the position in Italy, under the guidance of the Comintern, understood not only the need for developing work extensively among the masses by defending their direct interests (without for a moment forgetting their final aim),



and the need for using all existing legal possibilities for the purpose, but also decided to send its main forces to work in the fascist trade unions, in the *Dopolavora*, into the mutual benefit societies, the cooperatives, and into the "Fascist Youth", etc. But in bringing this work to the forefront, and making it the chief and most important link in the whole chain of its activities at the present moment, the Party on no account had or has any desire to underestimate or to doubt the need for breaking through fascist legality as quickly as possible. The need for this is so obvious, any doubt on this score would be so monstrous from the viewpoint of every Communist, that there has never been any discussion on this theme in our Party. And, frankly speaking, I am very much surprised that a discussion of this kind can be raised at the present moment.

#### THE WORK IN THE FASCIST MASS ORGANIZATIONS

If the Party has decided to bring to the forefront the question of using legal possibilities, if it has decided to make work in the fascist mass organizations the center of its activities, it is exclusively because it has come to understand that only in this way will it succeed in inspiring the broad masses to fight to break through fascist legality, and consequently, to come out of the position, deep underground, where it is today.

If it is not understood, firstly, that only by bringing about a break in fascist legality will the working class movement and the Communist Party be able to come out of their position deep underground, secondly, that only by changing the existing relation of forces in favor of the proletariat can the framework of fascist legality be broken, and thirdly, that only by making broad use of existing legal possibilities will it be possible to change this relation of forces, if all this is not understood, and if, on the contrary, the Party's emergence from its present position deep underground, and the breaking through of legality, are taken as things quite apart and opposite (as Comrade Tunelli does), then neither the real political meaning nor the prospects facing the tactics of using legal possibilities will ever be understood either. The result of this will be a conscious or unconscious underestimation of the meaning of these tactics.

This is why all ambiguity in this sphere must be made clear at all costs. That is why, I think, it would be useful to occupy a few pages in replying to some lines which Comrade Tunelli has devoted to this argument.

2. What is the main danger in the Communist Party of Italy today? Sectarianism, "carbonardism", the remains of Bordigism or the theory of spontaneity?

Comrade Tunelli's tendency towards schematism, to an undialectic analysis of problems, is clearly displayed in the very way in which he raises these questions.

And, indeed, he schematically sets the theory of spontaneity (which, in his opinion, means the Right deviation without exception), against the tendencies towards sectarianism, "carbonardism", the relics of Bor-

digism, which are still current in our Party, and comes to the conclusion that the chief danger facing our Party today is not the tendency towards sectarianism and "carbonardism", not the remains of Bordigism, but, on the contrary, the theory of spontaneity.

In my article, I asserted that:

"... the widespread tendencies of sectarianism and the bowing down to spontaneity ... do not mutually neutralize each other, as might be expected from a shallow analysis, but on the contrary, are linked together and strengthen each other." (Page 859, No. 22, 1934.)

A short time prior to this, the Central Committee of our Party gave the following authoritative estimation of its work, which was fully approved by the E.C.C.I.

"The Communist Party of Italy carried on an insufficient struggle against certain historical traditions in Italy (carbonardism) and in the Party itself (Bordigism); against sectarianism, which is still widespread *and which is at the present moment, the most dangerous form of the manifestation of opportunism in the Communist Party of Italy, a form which does not, moreover, represent any sort of guarantee against Right opportunism.*" (My italics—K.P.)

Clear, is it not?

How, on the other hand, can Comrade Tunelli assert that my article contained an underestimation of the danger arising from the theory of spontaneity?

The conclusion which I draw from the critical analysis of the work of the Party was formulated as follows in my article:

"... we encounter the resistance to attempts to utilize legal possibilities, to convert the work in the fascist organizations into a basis for all mass Party work, and to begin a mass movement with the simplest, most elementary 'legal' demands. The conception of mass work as consisting entirely of the distribution of illegal literature, the too general character of this literature, with slogans which ignore the level of the movement reached, the absence of any response to demagogic fascist agitation, the difficult language of this literature—all this in essence was an expression of the conviction that the workers themselves, without the *everyday interference of the Party*, would *spontaneously* be able to make up for the shortcomings in Party work. It was an expression of the conviction that the leaflets, the newspapers, the call to struggle are sufficient to rouse the workers to action and raise the movement to a higher level, to ever more radical aims." (Page 859, Vol. 22, 1934.)

How can anybody who reads my article carefully come to the conclusion that I underestimate the danger of spontaneity and set my article, as Comrade Tunelli does, against the article "Where Lies the Strength of Italian Fascism", written by Comrade Ercoli where he also emphasizes the importance of this danger in our Party?

But is it really true that the theory of spontaneity is set against sectarian tendencies, carbonardism and the allies of Bordigism?

Comrade Tunelli makes this assertion, but he contradicts himself when he points out that one of the characteristic peculiarities of the Bordigian "Left deviation" is its readiness to "passively wait for the point in the revolutionary situation when the Party is able to carry out its revolutionary task of taking power". (Page 179, Vol. 24, 1934.) Is it possible that Bordigian "anti-situationism" (the denial of the importance for our tactics of changes in the situation), which leads to passively waiting for a revolutionary situation, does not represent one of the most important, characteristic manifestations of the theory of spontaneity?

#### SECTARIAN TENDENCIES—THE MOST DANGEROUS FORM OF OPPORTUNISM IN THE C.P. OF ITALY

I am firmly convinced as hitherto that according to the assertion of the Central Committee of our Party, quoted above (to which apparently Comrade Tunelli cannot subscribe), the most dangerous form in which opportunism manifests itself in the Communist Party of Italy today are sectarian tendencies, "carbonardism", the relics of Bordigism, which often find their expression in just this theory of spontaneity.

This obviously does not mean at all that there are no clearly expressed Right deviations, no relics of Social-Democratic moods and ideology, no tendency towards "khvostism" (dragging at the tail of events, *Ed.*) in our Party at all. The development of all these tendencies is considerably lightened by the fact that of recent years we have recruited numerous elements into our Party from the ranks of Social-Democracy, and still more so as a result of the terrorist pressure of fascism and its totalitarianism, which inevitably, to a certain extent, demoralize certain of our comrades, and engender feelings of passivity among them.

If Comrade Tunelli had restricted himself to the remark that this fact was not perhaps sufficiently underlined in my article, one might still be able to agree with him. But since Comrade Tunelli at bottom underestimates the sectarianism of the majority of our comrades, since he does not see that it is the chief danger in our Party at the present moment, and therefore simply rejects the estimation and instructions of the International itself, I think that his mistake should be seriously criticized.

3. The need to dwell on these two important and, undoubtedly, actual problems, prevents me from replying in detail to other less important and less actual questions put forward by Comrade Tunelli.

I will have to be brief.

Is it true that our Party was more active and fought longer against Bordigism than against the Rights, as Comrade Tunelli asserts?

If we take the whole of the history of our Party, from its foundation till today, and if, on the other hand, we count only the number of articles and resolutions that have appeared—then perhaps Comrade Tunelli is right.



But if, on the contrary, we bear in mind what this Bordigism actually meant for our Party, if we bear in mind that during 1921 and 1922 the whole of the Central Committee (Political Bureau) of the Party consisted of Bordigists, that at the Second Party Congress a considerable majority voted in favor of the "Rome Theses" of such lamented fame, which were 100 per cent Bordigian; that during 1923-24 a big majority of our lower and middle Party forces (down to our inter-district secretaries) were Bordigists, that at the Party Conference in 1924, 80 per cent of those present were in favor of Bordiga's theses; if we bear in mind that the majority of our oldest and most skilled comrades were followers of Bordiga; if, finally, we bear in mind that between 1928 and 1933, the Party carried on a by no means adequate struggle against the relics of Bordigism and against "carbonardism" (in my article I gave extremely precise information not about open Bordigism, but about "the relics of Bordigism", which is frequently unconscious; I spoke very precisely not about the whole history of the Party, but about the period which followed the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Italy)—if all this is taken into consideration then it becomes clear that from the *political* viewpoint Comrade Tunelli's assertions are entirely unfounded.

4. Is sectarianism a "cause", as I asserted in my article, or only a "condition"?

I might object that insofar as the use of the word "sectarianism" is generally accepted in our Parties, to characterize not only the *condition* of being boxed in to be found in the Party today, but also the cause of it, insofar as in questions of language, as we know, custom rather than the dictionary, is, to a large extent, the law—the "big methodological mistake" of which Comrade Tunelli accuses me exists only in his own imagination.

But is it really worthwhile entering into a discussion of this kind, one which, to my mind, is more suitable for professors of philology than for political fighters?

5. Is it true that in my article I at all times and at every opportunity treated sectarianism and the "Left" deviation as things identical, as Comrade Tunelli asserts?

On the contrary, on page 858 (No. 22, 1934) of my article, where I point out the typical Menshevist mistakes made by certain organizations of our Party and which actually amount to "confusing the sympathizers with our Party members", I added that this mistake—although at first glance it may appear otherwise—was also a mistake of a sectarian character.

Then what is all this storm in a teapot made by Comrade Tunelli?

6. Some sufficiently authoritative comrades have remarked—and perhaps not without cause—that in my article I abuse self-criticism and do not sufficiently emphasize the real successes of the Party.

Four-fifths of my article is devoted exclusively to self-criticism. But in one place (page 860, No. 22, 1934) I wrote that "during the last few years, especially last year and this year . . . it (the Party) has

corrected its worst mistakes [note: "worst"! ] to a great degree, has eliminated some of its shortcomings. . . ." This is enough for Comrade Tunelli to assert that the estimation is too favorable, too self-satisfied.

It seems to me that at times Comrade Tunelli forgets the significance of what he is reading . . . and of what he is writing!

7. In one place in my article (page 855, No. 22, 1934), I assert that "after the coming of fascism to power very important changes took place in the very organic structure of the working class". To prove my point I introduced several facts which Comrade Tunelli mostly omitted in his quotation, perhaps in order to facilitate his argument. However, it is possible to introduce several numerous other facts, to confirm the correctness of this assertion.

"It can nevertheless be said, in general", writes Comrade Ercoli, for example, "that in size and in relative position, the strata of highly skilled workers has been considerably curtailed. The large majority of the masses consists of 'skilled assistants', trained for serial production, and of ordinary apprentices. The percentage of women engaged in industry has increased, and the skill of the workers has dropped on the whole."

In my opinion there are enough of these facts to prove that "very important changes have taken place . . . in the very organic structure of the working class", and it is more than permissible, of course, to discuss this question. But what, on the contrary, in my opinion is absolutely impermissible—and not serious—is to say as Comrade Tunelli does, that by making this assertion "Comrade Roncoli even tries to throw the responsibility for the lag behind of the Italian working class movement from the Party on to the working class". (Page 980, No. 24, 1934.) As though we can make the working class responsible for the structural changes taking place in the ranks of the working class itself!

8. I made the statement that "seven or eight years of the fascist regime and three or four years of "totalitarian" fascism have had a strong ideological influence on the broad strata of the working class" (the expression "on the broad strata" means, I think, "over different strata", and "over all strata"); and Tunelli draws the conclusion that from my point of view the "working class of Italy [i.e., not strata of the working class, but the whole of the working class—can you call this a serious way of conducting a discussion?] agree with the fascists that 'the crisis calls for sacrifices from all classes'". (Page 981.) And this, in my opinion, is in contradiction with the fact of the widespread formula: "Let war come, and then we shall get arms and shall be able to overthrow fascism!" But this is purely a contradiction in outward appearance, because fascism affects different strata of the workers in different ways; it is even able to convince some strata of the workers of the need for all classes to make sacrifices, while among other strata, fascist influence is expressed "only" in the fact that they passively wait for the war which will put weapons in the hands of the workers. If we do not understand the different forms of fascist influence over different

strata of the workers, it will be impossible to understand anything of the Italian situation and the tasks facing our Party.

GENERAL POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM COMRADE  
TUNELLI'S ARTICLE

While criticizing my article, Comrade Tunelli does not come to any general or concrete political conclusions.

On the other hand, I consider it essential to draw general political conclusions from Comrade Tunelli's article, *i.e.*, to expose its concrete, political meaning.

1. By incorrectly setting the need for mobilizing the forces of the Party and the proletariat, in order to break through fascist legality, against the need for the Party to come out of its present position, deep underground, through the use of all legal possibilities, Comrade Tunelli offers resistance in actual fact to the chief instruction put forward by our Party and the Twelfth E.C.C.I. Plenum, and confirmed in subsequent resolutions.

2. By incorrectly setting the theory of spontaneity against the tendencies towards sectarianism, "carbonardism", and the remains of Bordigism, which are still widely current in our Party, Comrade Tunelli manifests an underestimation of the latter and rejects the most exact appraisal of the work of our Party recently, given by the Central Committee of our Party.

Comrade Tunelli arrives at this position as a result of the fact that he distorts the nature of the struggle carried on in the past by the Communist Party of Italy against Bordigist and Right deviations, and that he accuses me of giving a definition of the causes of sectarianism which does not at all exist in my article.

3. Comrade Tunelli tries to deny the real—though limited—successes achieved by our Party during the last two years, through carrying out the instructions of the Comintern.

4. By denying the changes in the organic structure of the Italian working class which have taken place since the advent of fascism to power, Comrade Tunelli shows that he has not sensed the need to adapt out tactics, our forms of work, and our language, to new strata of workers who have entered industry during these years; in other words, he resists the instructions of the Comintern and the Central Committee of our Party in this sphere as well.

In actual practice he arrives at these conclusions because of his underestimation—or misunderstanding, and this leads to the same results—of the influence of fascism over broad strata of the working class.

These are undoubtedly the actual, political conclusions that can be drawn from a careful analysis of the article written by Comrade Tunelli, after giving it a preliminary cleansing of all kinds of scholasticism.

It is essential that we fight with the greatest energy and persistence against assertions of this kind, against *political viewpoints* of this kind which are capable of throwing our Party back to a sectarian position, which, fortunately, has to a considerable extent, already been overcome.



## For Unity in the Communist Party of Japan

**T**HE Communist Party of Japan was formed and grew strong in a relentless struggle against deviations. It crushed liquidationism from the Right (Yamakawaism) as well as liquidationism from the "Left" (Fukomotoism). In this struggle the Communist Party of Japan defended and consolidated its revolutionary principles and trained its cadres.

Under the leadership of its Central Committee, the Party took and continues to take a Bolshevik, consistently internationalist stand on one of the most difficult questions of the liberation movement of the proletariat, *viz.*, the question of war. Under the leadership of the Central Committee, the Party, in Bolshevik fashion, continues its advance against the stream, against the fever of chauvinism, bourgeois nationalism and social chauvinism. Under the leadership of its Central Committee the Party developed illegal revolutionary agitation against war and the monarchy, and in a situation of unprecedented terror, has achieved no mean successes in this field. Its members are carrying on heroic Bolshevik work in giving revolutionary education to the masses in the army, navy and munition plants. Even in the villages among the peasantry the Party has succeeded in kindling the flames of the anti-war movement.

Under the leadership of its Central Committee the Party is successfully defending the Leninist line on the basic problems of the coming revolution in Japan, *viz.*, its character and tasks particularly on the agrarian question.

The Party is conducting a merciless struggle against the bourgeois landlord police monarchy, against the existing order of landlord parasitism and capitalist exploitation.

Under the leadership of its Central Committee, the Party has trained numerous cadres and Communist workers, it has educated thousands of revolutionary peasants and this undoubtedly will play a decisive role in the coming agrarian revolution. The Communist Party's influence has penetrated deeply not only among the masses of workers but also among the intellectuals, and students. Proof of this may be found in the fact that the best elements among the Japanese intellectuals actively support the Communist Party, and strive towards it.

The Communist Party of Japan has become the invincible, indestructible vanguard of the Japanese proletariat. Even the most furious repression and acts of provocation on the part of the monarchist government have proved unsuccessful in stopping the advance of the Communist movement of Japanese workers. Year after year many thousands of revolutionary workers, peasants and students are thrown into prison, but their places are taken by new, still more numerous, detachments of revolutionary workers and peasants. This is possible only because the

Party has taken deep root in the ranks of the working class and among the toilers of town and country. Even the monarchist government has been compelled to recognize this decisive achievement of the Communist Party of Japan.

The Japanese Minister of Justice, Chara, speaking in parliament on March 8, 1935, in support of a bill introducing capital punishment not only for membership of the Party but also for sympathy with it, stated the following:

"Notwithstanding all the measures taken by the government since 1928 to cut the roots of the Communist movement, this movement has taken such deep roots that even after repeated arrests of Communists and of the entire leadership of the movement, after the suppression of the Communist organization, the Communists at liberty continue their activities, and the government is unable to achieve the final destruction of Communism."

The successes of the Communist Party make it possible, and at the same time render still more acute the necessity which has undoubtedly matured, for steps to be directly taken to solve the next task facing the Party, *viz.*, of coming closer to the broad masses of workers, peasants and toilers and developing a real mass movement for their everyday vital demands.

#### THE FIGHT FOR THE UNITED FRONT THE CENTRAL TASK

The development of the Party has reached a point when its urgent and central problem is systematic work among the broad masses of rank and file workers, and not only as has been the case up till now, among the more advanced workers. In the preceding period of its development, the Party succeeded in establishing its revolutionary forces; at present the further growth and consolidation of the Party demands a turn in its work which will result in directing its forces for preparing and organizing a real mass movement in defense of the vital interests of the workers and peasants.

Even police reports of Communist arrests reveal the fact that the Communists and their adherents are working actively not only in all industrial centers, but in all prefectures, and in many cases in the far off sections of the country. There can be no doubt that among the workers and peasants there is a strong feeling of dissatisfaction with the continuous lowering of their standard of living and at being deprived of their rights. However, the Communist Party has up till now not succeeded in raising a mass movement on any considerable scale.

There are, of course, many reasons for this. The main thing, however, is to clarify and eliminate the causes of this situation which are dependent upon the Communist Party itself.

There is no doubt that the Communist Party has not yet learned to utilize every manifestation of dissatisfaction, to grasp and develop even the smallest manifestations of protest against the vileness of the monarchist regime.

It is beyond doubt that the Party has not yet learned to

"... respond to all and every manifestation of license and

oppression, no matter where they take place, no matter what class or strata of the population they concern, to sum up these manifestations into one general picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation." (Lenin.)

The Party has not yet learned to utilize every manifestation of dissatisfaction among the various sections of the toiling classes, it has not yet learned how to utilize and develop all the beginnings of protest against the policy of the ruling classes which arise in the country.

But the main and prime task is to change the Party's approach to the workers who are members of the Shakai Taishuto (the Japanese Social-Democratic Party) and towards those workers who take no interest in politics or who still believe in the monarchist regime, so as to bring about in practice the joint struggle of the workers of different political shades for their vital needs.

We must be clear on the fact that the broad masses of rank and file workers of Japan in their overwhelming majority have either not yet been drawn into politics, or still trust their enemies, the social chauvinists, fascists and the monarchist government. At the same time, however, among these workers there is and there cannot fail to be, a feeling of dissatisfaction against the capitalists.

The task facing the Communists, therefore, is to be able to approach these workers who do not agree with the Communist Party, to approach the organizations to which these workers belong. And this approach should be of such a character that we seize hold of the dissatisfaction of these workers against the capitalists and the government, and work among the wide masses of workers in such a way as to rouse their desire for active struggle in defense of their vital interests and against the capitalist offensive. The Communists should put to the forefront such economic and juridical demands of the workers and peasants which are considered by these workers and peasants to be the most urgent ones, demands which are of the most concern to the workers and peasants. The Party must call on the masses to protest against all those cases of political oppression which are of the most concern to the masses of the working class.

Those who regard strikes as the only form of struggle of the workers against the capitalists, and do not recognize more primitive forms of struggle are wrong. There are still many factories where, owing to lack of class consciousness or partly to the lack of organization, the workers submit in silence to wage cuts, to the extension of the working day and to the intensification of labor. In the textile factories, especially, the working men and working women allow the capitalists to trample on their human dignity, to lock the women textile workers like cattle into prison-like barracks, etc.

It is obvious that the question cannot be formulated in the following way—either strike or nothing at all, there are no other forms of struggle and protest. Silent submission is the worst thing. If the masses in the given factory are still incapable of replying by strike action to the onslaught of the capitalists, to the violation of the workers' rights, we must work to have the workers call meetings to discuss their



conditions. We must work to get meetings of protest called and get the workers to advance their demands, to send a delegation to their employer and to organize a stay-in strike, etc. When the masses come into motion it will be very much easier then to raise their movement to more active forms of struggle. When the workers in a number of factories in one form or another manifest their protest against, for example, the slavery of the barracks, this will create the necessary conditions for the organization of a movement of the workers throughout the city in defense of their rights and their human dignity.

The more the broad masses are drawn into the struggle against the capitalist offensive, the greater will be the possibilities for the Party to raise the level of the demands of the masses, to win their confidence, without becoming separated from them, and to raise their movement to more and more active forms of struggle. Large scale mass actions of the proletariat are what are required if the broad masses are to be able to get to know the Communist Party to such an extent as to have complete confidence in it. For the present the Communists and their adherents are still an insignificant minority among the workers, and therefore more flexible tactics are needed so as to find an approach to the organizations opposed to the Communist Party, the majority of whose members are workers.

The necessity for organizing mass resistance to the capitalist offensive demands that the struggle for the united front of the workers should become the center of the Communist Party's policy of mass activities.

One of the outstanding problems in the establishment of the united front is the struggle for the unification of the various scattered trade unions. The Party will be in a position to fulfil this task only if all Communists and all workers under the Communist Party's influence are members of the legal trade union in the factory in which they work. In the present situation this is without a doubt necessary as well in order to raise and lead within the legal trade unions the broad movement of the masses of members for unity of the trade unions of all various tendencies on the basis of trade union democracy and active struggle for the workers' interests. This unification must be brought about in each branch of industry, in each city and district and finally throughout the country.

In the peasant unions the Left elements have achieved certain success within the last year in the unification of local organizations of peasant unions of various tendencies (the Kinki Conference). It will be impossible to develop this movement further unless a firmer and more consistent course is taken for struggle for the complete unification of the non-Party mass peasant organizations and for joint united front action with those peasant organizations which do not wish complete unification. In formulating the most urgent and burning demands of the masses, the demands of the peasantry to the government, the Communist Party will be able to bring about a situation in which these demands will become the platform of a mass movement on a national scale. Furthermore, the working class organizations in the cities will take a most active part in the movement to achieve these demands.

This program can also include such demands as a law forbidding

the confiscation of leased land from the peasants, or one forbidding the confiscation of a year's supply of rice in payment of taxes and debts, the distribution of rice from the government warehouses to the starving peasants, the lowering of taxes, etc.

The Communist Party has always fought and cannot discontinue to fight for the unity of all workers in defense of their interests against the capitalist offensive and against the most infamous acts of the government. The realization of the necessity of this struggle is developing among the workers of various political tendencies.

But at the time when the leaders of the Shakai Taishuto are attempting to transform the workers' strivings towards unity in the struggle against capitalism into the unity of the workers with their exploiters, the bourgeoisie and monarchy, the Communists of Japan, on the other hand, have not yet succeeded in counteracting these efforts of the Shakai Taishuto leaders first of all because the Party did not succeed in correctly and sufficiently utilizing the united front tactics. There are some who think that the struggle for the united front can be limited to an approach to the Social-Democratic workers to join in the struggle organized by the Communist Party. These people are deeply mistaken. The struggle for the united front demands that the Communists should be able to come to an agreement not only with non-Party workers, but with all those workers and organizations with a working class membership which, although they do not agree with the Communist Party, are prepared to fight in defense of even the most elementary interests of the workers and peasants.

The Japanese Social-Democratic Party, the Shakai Taishuto, is the social mass party of Japanese imperialism. Its leaders openly preach monarchism and an alliance with the fascist military clique, they organize "class collaboration", in other words, the subordination of the workers to their capitalist exploiters, they actively support the imperialist robber policy pursued by the Japanese bourgeoisie. The chances are very small that a united front with the workers organized in the Shakai Taishuto will be established by means of negotiations with the leaders of this party. However, even if the leadership of the Shakai Taishuto does not agree to negotiations, it would be wrong to limit the struggle for the united front only to the struggle of unity from below and ignore those organizations of working class composition which are in the anti-Communist camp. This is all the more incorrect since there is within the Shakai Taishuto very much dissatisfaction with the treacherous policy of its leaders. Among the lower and middle functionaries of the Shakai Taishuto there are some who can be won over to the side of class struggle.

With regard to the workers who belong to the Shakai Taishuto, the Communists can and must bring about joint struggle with them for the vital interests of the working class. It is a question first and foremost of the active work of the Communists among them, work based upon comradely persuasion, upon a comradely explanation of the need to unite all workers for resistance to the capitalist offensive. With the existing decentralization and weak political discipline and inner struggle between the local organizations and the Shakai Taishuto center the possibility is

not excluded that under the pressure of the rank and file some of the local organizations, particularly the youth organizations, will participate in the united front.

The Shakai Taishuto has recently been issuing demagogic declarations on labor legislature, on relief for the peasants and against the system of employing temporary workers. But the only method of attaining these demands according to the Central Committee of the Shakai Taishuto is the dispatch of petitions and delegations consisting of members of the Shakai Taishuto Central Committee to Cabinet Ministers, parliament and other organs of the monarchist regime. The Communists can accept these demagogical demands of the Central Committee of the Shakai Taishuto which are in accordance with the interests of the masses. These demands should be regarded as a minimum around which joint struggle of working class and peasant organizations against the capitalists and landlords is to be organized. These demands should be regarded as the minimum which can be presented to the government by those engaged in this united front. In doing so, only one condition should be advanced, *viz.*, that the broad masses should be drawn into the movement for these demands and that a mass movement should be developed for their demands, even if it takes such forms as mass meetings, the discussion of these demands at meetings of workers and peasant organizations and individual factories, workers' clubs, etc., the sending of mass delegations to present the demands accepted at these meetings to the government and later the discussion at mass meetings of the reports of these delegations and of the action of the government, etc., etc. And if the Central Committee of the Shakai Taishuto declines this offer of the united front made by the Communist Party, then if the Communist Party does its work ably, it will not hinder, but on the contrary, will foster the establishment of a united front with the local Shakai Taishuto organizations, with its youth organization, and more over, the establishment of the united front of the mass non-party working class organizations.

The reign of terror in Japan makes it extraordinarily difficult for the Communist Party to conduct its activities in establishing a united front with Shakai Taishuto organizations, in the open, in its own name. This, however, makes it imperative to find means and ways of overcoming these difficulties and of operating the practical measures of the Party as regards the organizations of the united front through various legal organizations and legal spokesmen sincerely striving towards the establishment of the united front, or from within legal working class organizations, etc.

At present it is particularly important to strengthen by all means the utilization of all kinds of legal possibilities. This is all the more necessary since the legal possibilities on a national scale have been very severely narrowed down by the growth of police terror. On a local scale, however, particularly in the factories and around them, these possibilities for legal work are still considerable. Especially are the possibilities for legal agitation in the spirit of the Communist Party presented in the campaigns conducted by the reformist trade unions, peasant unions,

Shakai Taishuto and other organizations, for example, on the question of peasant relief, social legislation and such facts as the demand of the silk growers' association for the use of part of the military budget for peasant relief, etc. There is no doubt that the movement for the united front will create a number of new possibilities for extending the legal agitation of the Party.

There is no need to prove that in conducting a struggle for the united front the Party must in every way possible strengthen its independent work among the masses, including the extension of its illegal agitation for the full slogans of the Party.

The necessity for a radical change in the work of the Party has fully matured. Simply marking time will inevitably give rise to legitimate dissatisfaction and will lead to a weakening of Party discipline. The sectarian habits of the past, of the period when the work of the Party was in the main of a propagandist character and was limited to small circles and groups of the more advanced workers, certainly makes it more difficult to solve the new problems confronting the Party. Moreover, these sectarian habits of the past are one of the causes explaining the lagging behind of the Party in its mass activities. The Communists must develop Bolshevik self-criticism against the remnants of sectarianism. In criticizing the lagging behind of the Party, the Communists must not and should not forget the difficulties created by furious police repressions and the mass arrests of Communists, including members of the Party's Central Committee.

In bringing about this turn in the activities of the Party, the necessity for the *iron unity of the Party* is more vital than at any time in the past. Particularly great is the danger of opportunist deviations. Therefore, the opposition fraction which arose in the Communist Party of Japan, first under the name of "Conference of the N.N. Nuclei" and which later came out openly as a fraction and established its own leading center, the "organizational committee for the calling of a delegate conference" with its central organ, the *Tassuha* (fraction of the minority) is all the more dangerous for the Communist movement in Japan.

What is this opposition?

The opposition continues to explain its splitting activity by stating that the Communist Party Central Committee is in the hands of agents provocateurs. The documents of the opposition itself, however, prove the baselessness of this statement.

Let us analyze the situation. In the documents of the opposition there is first of all a charge of provocation directed against only one member of the Central Committee. Besides, in its first statement the opposition puts forward only hazy guesses and hints, and only after six weeks or two months, following the split of the opposition from the Party, in its second statement did the opposition definitely accuse Comrade Hakamata.\*

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\* The bourgeois press reports that Comrade Hakamata has been arrested. If these reports are true, then the leaders of the opposition have helped in this arrest by accusing him of being a provocateur without showing any verified proof of this. The opposition published Hakamata's real name in its press, accompanied by a full description and biographical data. This is what factional struggle leads to!



Secondly, all the material cited by the opposition against this member of the Central Committee may be regarded as unverified suspicions, which of course are insufficient grounds for accusing any Central Committee member of being an agent provocateur. Thirdly, the opposition itself acknowledged that it began its struggle against the Central Committee in December, 1933 (see statement of "Conference of N.N. Nuclei", March 20, 1934). In other words, the struggle was begun at a time when even the organizers of the opposition did not accuse any of the Central Committee members of provocation. Fourthly, from the opposition's documents it is obvious that it was formed in a period when the Central Committee was led by a comrade who even today, after his arrest, is beyond suspicion even by the opposition. Moreover, the opposition is compelled to characterize this comrade as "one of the best".

It stands to reason that any serious suspicion of provocation directed against any Party worker must be carefully verified and examined. But there is no basis for believing the statements of the organizers of the opposition that they were *compelled* to organize a fraction just because the Central Committee of the Party was, according to them, captured by provocateurs.

The real reason for the origin of the opposition should not be sought here. The organizers of the opposition themselves acknowledge in their statements that they took up the struggle against the Central Committee as a result of dissatisfaction with the policy of the C.C. and of its "incapable leadership". This also, according to their own words, served as a basis for their contention that the Central Committee had been captured by provocateurs.

The Party membership and all Party organizations must carefully examine, study and verify the sources of this dissatisfaction of the opposition with regard to the Central Committee.

The leaders and organizers of the opposition are functionaries of legal non-Party organizations (members of the Communist fraction in the Peasants' Union and Workers' Cooperative Societies).

In other countries where the Communist Parties are illegal, there were cases in the past when functionaries of the legal organizations were dissatisfied with the political line of the Communist Party and conducted a struggle against the Party and its leadership. In most cases the reason for this was that the Party functionaries in the legal organizations were divorced from the Party and slid over to opportunism and to the adaptation of their activities to the existing police bourgeois landlord regime, underestimating the role of illegal work, losing their confidence in the forces of the proletariat and finally becoming the prisoners of legalist illusions.

In the light of this experience of the Communist movement in other countries, one cannot help calling attention to or lessening the importance of the fact that even the Kansai District Party Committee (the only big Party organization that went over to the opposition) has recognized that, firstly, the organizers of the opposition, while sharply criticizing the "Left" deviation in the Party, have forgotten the Right opportunist danger. Simultaneously (according to the Kansai Committee), the "dan-

ger of a Right deviation is very considerable". Secondly, the organizers of the opposition see only the negative points in the past history of the Party and in the activities of its leadership (*Tassuha* No. 1).

The organizers of the opposition accused the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan of a "Left" deviation and of sectarianism. We should note that this accusation is hurled not only against the last Central Committee, but that the charge of an incorrect Leftist policy is hurled against the policy of the Party as a whole "over the last one or two years", *viz.*, prior to the formation of the opposition.

When it is a question, as in the present case, of the basic problems of the Party's policy, of the fate of the liberation movement of the proletariat, the Party and every one of its members are obliged and have the full right to demand complete clarity on the essence of the differences. They have a full right to demand precise and concrete proof of every charge advanced against the Party leadership and a clear cut reply of the opposition on the basic questions of Party policy.

#### THE OPPOSITION HINDERS CLARITY

But the organizers and leaders of the opposition have not in the smallest degree given the Party membership even a minimum possibility of analyzing the essence of the political differences between the opposition and the Central Committee of the Party. What is more, the organizers of the opposition have by all means prevented this clarity from being obtained by the fact that their struggle against the Party's policy is being conducted under the banner and cloak of the struggle against the "provocateur Central Committee", by the fact that what they consider to be a wrong policy of the Central Committee they define as a "provocatory policy". Instead of a clear cut and honest explanation of their political differences, given within the framework of Party discipline, the organizers of the opposition have used the poisoned arrows of baseless and summary accusations of provocations against the Central Committee, they have chosen to foster the spy mania and demoralization of the Party's ranks.

The Party membership, particularly at such a moment of sharp inner Party struggle, cannot and must not take the opposition at its word. They cannot and must not take the opposition at its word in its charges against the Central Committee. The Party membership cannot simply take the word of the opposition that the political line which the opposition, so to speak, keeps hidden in its pocket, is the correct Bolshevik line.

The deeds and documents of the opposition are proof of the contrary.

The opposition states that the political line of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Japan is wrong. But in the process of the political struggle between the Central Committee of the Party and the opposition, the Central Committee of the C.P.J. unfailingly defended a correct political line against the incorrect, often Right opportunistic views of the opposition leadership. Every member of the Party can convince himself of this, by studying the leading articles of *Sekki* throughout this whole period, and comparing these articles with the documents of the opposi-

tion, particularly with those signed by the "Conference of NN Nuclei".

We know of no documents issued by the Central Committee or by the opposition in which the question of the united front, this major question of the mass policy of the Party, is taken up in full, and in which concrete forms and methods of solving this question are outlined. The opposition limits itself to a general remark about the "huge trade union front led by the Sodomei, remaining outside our influence, and the task of establishing a real united front is, it seems, not our task". But throughout the whole period of its existence, the opposition has done nothing to establish a united front. At the same time, however, as the Communist Party, even prior to the establishment of the opposition had taken the course of uniting the Senkai with the Zenno Sohombu, the opposition in its programmatic pamphlet, *The Present Organizational Tasks of Our Party in the Villages*, completely ignored this line of the Party and does not contain a single word about the unity of the peasant unions. Even in those cases where the opposition correctly notes the shortcomings of the Party it does not help to overcome them, but utilizes them for factional struggle against the Party, and thus only deepens these shortcomings.

#### ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

On the peasant question, the opposition leadership has deviated from Communism. Proof of this may be found in the opposition's official document, the pamphlet of the organizational committee, *The Present Organizational Tasks of Our Party in the Villages*.

This pamphlet advances the theory of the existence in Japan of a special class of tenants. This theory has nothing in common with Marxism. The danger of such a theory of separating the tenant farmers from the remaining masses of the peasants is especially great in connection with the general line of this pamphlet on the peasant question. The pamphlet emphasizes that the basic task facing the Party organizations in the villages is "welfare work in the village".

"At the present time the slogan 'All village nuclei must become revolutionary welfare workers of the peasant Buraku' is the central program of organizational work in the villages, the characteristic point in the historical turn in the Japanese peasant movement" (p. 17).

The pamphlet gives the following explanation of this somewhat mysterious term, "revolutionary welfare work" (*Kokamei seki sewayaku no Katsudo*):

"Welfare work in the Buraku consists not only in being the counsel of the masses, in enjoying their confidence and winning a good reputation. It is necessary to be at the head of the struggle and to win the respect and gratitude of the masses for our everyday small cares; it is necessary to be authoritative . . ." (pp. 17-18).

The pamphlet denies the possibility of linking up the struggle of the peasantry in various districts and regions. In this pamphlet the opposition states that there can be no general peasant demands. This

is to be understood if one remembers that the opposition speaks only of the current, small, local demands of the peasantry.

The opposition separates the economic struggle from the political struggle. Undoubtedly, the Communists must actively support even the smallest demands of the peasants and the most primitive forms of struggle if they are directed against the landlords and authorities. But the basic question guiding the policy of the Communist Party in its everyday activities consists in revolutionizing the peasant masses, in developing and by all means activizing the peasant movement.

Just as it is wrong to limit the work of the Party in the villages to distribution of leaflets, so it is wrong to limit our work to the everyday needs of the peasants. What is required is to combine the work in defense of the everyday needs of the peasants with revolutionary agitation, with support of the most primitive forms of struggle for the interests of the toiling peasants with the preparation of revolutionary actions of the broad masses of the toilers in the village. This is the road chosen by the Communist Party of Japan and along this road the Party continues its march.

The pamphlet mentions the connection of small demands with political demands. This, however, is only an explanation to its basic line which by no means can be regarded as a line directed towards the development of the class struggle against the landlords and the monarchy. This incorrect line finds its further expression in the estimation which the pamphlet gives of active forms and methods of peasant struggle:

“The mass actions of the working class are first and foremost the strike and sabotage, but the mass actions of the peasantry are exclusively demonstrations to the landlords’ estates, rural authorities, etc. . . . However, a demonstration before the landlord’s home is, of course, in its own way a threat to the enemy, but it remains simply mass extortion. And if the landlord or the local authorities succeed in running away or if they avoid meeting the representatives of the peasants, then there is nothing left to the latter but to set fire to the landlord’s estate.”

People with such an attitude towards the mass struggle of the peasantry have no right to call themselves Communists, nor even peasant revolutionaries.

The scheme of village organizations proposed by this pamphlet and their inter-relations are simply the result of the arm-chair creative work of people who are politically illiterate and isolated from the actual struggle of the masses. At the basis of this scheme there also lies the refusal to work to prepare the peasant masses for the revolutionary struggle for the land.

#### THE MAIN MISTAKES IN THE OPPOSITION PLATFORM

What constitute the mistakes of the basic points in the pamphlet?

The authors of the pamphlet do not understand, or do not wish to understand, that in Japan the poor and middle peasantry are vitally



interested in the destruction of the ownership of the land by the landlords. Semi-feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landlords is still the prevailing form in the Japanese village, and because of this the poor and middle peasants are able to establish a united front against the landlords, a united front with one program of struggle for the confiscation of the landlords' estates, for the benefit of the peasants.

The majority of the Japanese peasantry are fundamentally interested in the agrarian revolution. This of course by no means lessens the tasks facing the Party of simultaneously organizing and leading the struggle of the agricultural laborers against their exploiters.

It is true, of course, that the Communists must defend even the very smallest day to day demands of the peasants, demands directed against the landlords, the authorities and capitalists. But the authors of the pamphlet, in dealing with this question, have lost all sense of the revolutionary perspective. Their line leads to a narrowing down of, and by no means to an extension of, the peasants' struggle. Their line, if pursued, will not activate the struggle of the peasantry, but on the contrary, will limit it to passive conflicts and subordinate the peasants' movement to police rules. In fighting against those who want to subordinate the peasant movement to the framework of police legality, the Communist Party of Japan must at the same time fight in a most decisive manner for the utilization of all legal possibilities.

*Sekki* correctly and sharply criticizes the pamphlet issued by the opposition by pointing out that:

"A demonstration is an example of real mass action. However, apart from demonstrations the peasants have at their disposal as great a variety of other forms for struggle as the workers. We have in mind the struggle for the organization of the peasants against the payment of debts, taxes and rent, etc., and for the seizure of rice, fertilizers, etc." (*Sekki*, No. 181, Oct. 3, 1934.)

The leaders of the opposition have chosen as their starting point what is in essence a denial of the undisputed fact that the entire development of Japan is leading towards agrarian revolution. This explains their negative attitude towards the general demands of the peasants and towards direct methods of mass struggle. It should be noted, however, that the movement against the payment of rent, debts and against the landlords' right to deprive the peasant of his leased land, the movement for the free distribution of rice from the government warehouses and against the right to confiscate the last years' supply of rice, are all considerably popular throughout the country. This movement is still full of legalistic illusions, and of hopes that a petition to the government will change the situation. But this makes it all the more obligatory for the Communists to join such a mass movement in order to utilize the experience of it, to open the eyes of the peasants and teach them the simple truth that only by force can they achieve the fulfillment of their demands. And the bigger the mass scale of this peasant movement, the sooner will it go over to active forms of struggle. Cases of peasant attacks on government rice warehouses are the fore-

runners of this direct, decisive struggle of the peasantry for liberation from the yoke of the landlords. And those who are really striving to raise the class consciousness and revolutionary activity of the peasants cannot and should not underestimate the importance of illegal agitation and the "distribution of leaflets" in the way the opposition does.

The organizational views of the opposition are basically contradictory to the principles of the Communist International inasmuch as the opposition defends the existence of legitimacy of fractions within the Communist Party. This is not a Communist, but rather a Social-Democratic point of view.

In their attempts to find a basis for this "theory", the organizers of the opposition have gone as far as to state that the fact that the two agents provocateurs Oizumi and Obata were not invited to the meeting of the Central Committee when the question of their guilt as provocateurs was being discussed, an act which was absolutely necessary and is understood by every honest Party member, implies the establishment of a fraction within the Party, and furthermore, the opposition considers this to be a breach of discipline on the part of the Central Committee leadership. (*Tassuha*, No. 2.)

The opposition carried its struggle against the Central Committee beyond the framework of the Party. Its declarations, including its first one, which are full of unfounded charges of provocation against the Central Committee, were distributed through the post by the organizers of the opposition to non-members of the Party. Do we need to prove that such action is absolutely impermissible in an illegal Communist Party, and is extremely dangerous to the Party? Nevertheless, the opposition claims that this is permissible and characterizes this as "correcting the sectarian method of distributing Party materials" (*Tassuha*, No. 2).

The attitude of the opposition towards Sano, Nabeyama and Co.\* is undoubtedly an anti-Party attitude. Sano and Nabeyama are dirty traitors, renegades and agents provocateurs in the worst sense of that word. They are the bitterest enemies of the proletariat and the Communist Party. The Communists cannot do other than rouse the hatred of the masses of the workers against these vile traitors; the Communists must teach the masses to loathe these lackeys of Japanese imperialism. But the organizers of the opposition, who call themselves the "majority" fraction, not only fail to fulfil this elementary duty of every class-conscious worker, but on the contrary, criticize the Central Committee for its struggle against Sano and Nabeyama. They try to find justification for these renegades, whom they call "people with changed views" (*tenko sha*). They look for these justifications in the shortcomings, defects and policy of the Party!

\* Sano Gaku, former professor of the Waseda university in Tokyo, former member of the C.C. of the C.P. of Japan, arrested in 1929. During his first trial, Sano delivered a speech prepared jointly by the group of Communists on trial. But after this, in the summer of 1933, together with another former C.C. member, Nabeyama, he made a statement of his break with Communism and went over to the position of the military clique. Both of them declared their undivided loyalty to the monarchy and full support for the war plans of Japanese imperialism. In his declaration to the prosecutor and in his speech during his second trial in 1934, Sano delivered counter-revolutionary attacks against the Comintern, the C.P. of Japan and the Soviet Union, attempting to prove that the only road open to the Japanese proletariat is that of the Japanese emperor (*Kodo*).

In their declaration of March 20 the opposition openly call upon the Party membership to take heed of the political advice of these foul traitors, Sano and Nabeyama, and of their criticism of the Party's policy. The opposition made the following declaration:

"We think that while, on the question of strategy they (Sano and Nabeyama) have committed many mortal mistakes, on the question of trade union policy there are not a few points to which our attention should be called."

This is how the opposition attempts to build a bridge between the Party and Sano and Nabeyama, the bitterest enemies of the proletariat.

#### THE OPPOSITION BREAKS WITH THE ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF BOLSHEVISM

What is the significance of these facts?

These facts go to show that among the ring leaders and organizers of the opposition there are people who, under cover of the struggle against provocation, have broken away from the organizational principles of Bolshevism. They are people who have succumbed to the influence of Social-Democratic ideology and are now attempting to smuggle Social-Democratic views into the Party. The opposition is leading towards a split in the Party; it is weakening the vanguard of the proletariat. This is only of benefit to the exploiting classes and the secret police in their work of undermining the Party from within. The Communists must, and will continue, to carry on a relentless ideological and political struggle against such elements who are engaged in smuggling Social-Democratic influence into the ranks of the Party. However, the general atmosphere in which the opposition was originated and grew (the spreading of lack of confidence within the Party) and its slogan of struggle against provocation in the Party, which by the way, helped to win its followers, shows that at present, in the given period, the basic mass of the followers of the opposition consist of people who are subjectively loyal to Communism and are against a split in the Party. It would be wrong and dangerous not to see that rightful dissatisfaction with the remnants of sectarianism which actually exist in the work of the Party may serve to breed the growth of the opposition.

We must not underestimate the danger of the remnants of sectarianism within the Party. But is it not clear that factionalism is not a cure for the defects in the work of the Party? On the contrary, it only increases them. Remnants of sectarianism can and must be overcome by broad self-criticism based on the unity of the Party. The possibilities for this are all the more assured since the Central Committee of the Party, even prior to the organization of the opposition, recognized, and recognizes now, that the Party suffers from the remnants of sectarianism and that what is needed is a decisive change in its work. The C.C. is leading the struggle and well understands the need for struggle against the remnants of sectarianism in the Party. The opposition, instead of helping the C.C., carries on undermining work against it.

The establishment and the activities of the opposition have created a difficult situation in the Party. What must be done in order that the

Party may rapidly overcome this sickness in its ranks, and emerge from the present crisis with new strength and new fighting power?

1. Questions as to whether individual comrades are agents provocateurs or not must be dropped from the inner Party struggle. Such questions cannot be solved by factional struggle (on the contrary, such a struggle only renders them more complicated and creates excellent conditions for the penetration of provocateurs into the Party, and for them to carry on their undermining work there). These questions can only be solved by impartial investigation. As far back as the summer of 1934, in Comrade Okano's article "Against Provocateurs, Against Splitters" (published in the *Communist International*, English edition, Issue No. 17), attention was drawn to the necessity for the setting up of a commission to check up on all suspicions of provocation advanced against individual Party members, independent of their position in the Party or in the opposition and its leadership. If this has not been done up till now, then it is of course a mistake. The Central Committee of the Party must draw tried comrades from among those who are in the opposition in the Kansai Committee, into the organization of this commission. We must immediately put an end to the inner Party struggle based upon mutual accusations of provocation. This is the first necessary condition if the atmosphere in the Party is to be improved. It is the first necessary condition if the best elements of the Party, its factory groups, are to be able to say their considered word about the essence of the political differences existing in the Party.

#### COMRADE STALIN ON "FACTIONALISM"

2. All Party members and all the Party's units must realize the fatal consequences of factional struggle within the Party. They must decisively condemn those who insist upon continuing the factional struggle, or who in any way at all hinder its rapid liquidation. The Party members must master and remember the following statement made by Comrade Stalin about the harm of factionalism:

*"Wherein lies the harm of factionalism in the ranks of the Communist Parties?"*

*"First and foremost, in the fact that factionalism weakens the sense of Party spirit, dulls revolutionary sensitiveness, and blinds the Party leaders to such an extent that in their factional enthusiasm they are compelled to place factional interests above the interests of the Party, above the interests of the Comintern, above the interests of the working class. Factionalism frequently goes to such lengths that Party leaders, blinded by the factional struggle, are inclined to regard all facts and all events in the life of the Party, not from the point of view of the interests of the working class, but from the point of view of the interests of their own factional circle, from the point of view of the interests of their own factional kitchen. . . ."*

*"Secondly, in that factionalism interferes with the education of the Party in the spirit of policy based on principles, it interferes with the training of cadres in an honest, proletarian, incorruptible and revolutionary spirit, free from rotten dip-*



lomacy and unprincipled machinations. Leninism teaches us that politics based on principle is the only correct policy. Factionalism, on the contrary, holds that factional diplomacy and unprincipled factional machinations are the only correct policy. . . .

"*Thirdly*, in that factionalism, which weakens the Party's desire for unity and undermining the Party's iron discipline, gives rise in the Party to such a specifically factional regime under which all its internal life is exposed to the eyes of the class enemy, and the Party itself is in danger of becoming transformed into a plaything in the hands of the agents of the bourgeoisie.

"*Finally*, the harmfulness of factionalism lies in the fact that factionalism undermines the basis of all positive work in the Party, kills the desire of the Party members to concern themselves with questions of the everyday needs of the working class (wages, the working day, the betterment of the material conditions of the working class, etc.), weakens the activities of the Party, in the preparation of the working class for the class battles against the bourgeoisie, and thus creates a situation in which the Party's prestige must inevitably decline in the eyes of the workers, and the workers, instead of flocking to the Party in whole detachments, are compelled to leave the ranks of the Party." (*About the Right Factionalists in the American Party.*)

3. The Party units which joined the opposition faction must dissolve this faction. The Kansai District Committee, which is a large Party organization, and which did not fully align itself with the political viewpoints of the opposition, bears the greatest responsibility for the rapid liquidation of the faction. The Party units in the Kansai District must demand from the Kansai Party Committee that it immediately leave the opposition, and re-establishes contacts with the Central Committee of the Party.

The task of fully re-establishing Party unity must be controlled by the lower and especially the factory units throughout the Party.

The other existing factional groups, like the unprincipled grouplet which comes out under the banner of "Anonymous factory nucleus and anonymous central Party fraction of the C.P. of Japan" must also be immediately liquidated.

The dissolution of the new factions, their complete liquidation, is an absolutely necessary first step for the re-establishment and consolidation of unity within the Party. The further consolidation of Party unity *will be ensured by a correct political line*, by struggle against opportunistic and sectarian tendencies within the Party, by well developed and systematic criticism of the mistakes and shortcomings to be found in the activities and policy of the Party, by decisively and rapidly overcoming these shortcomings, and by rectifying these mistakes.

Factionalism becomes particularly dangerous at a time when the Party must make a turn in its work. It is at such times that factionalism inevitably leads to a situation in which those who counterpose themselves to the Party utilize the urgent necessity of changing the Party's policy not with a view to strengthening Communist principles but to renounce them. It is this danger which now exists in Japan.

The struggle for partial demands must become a major task in the Party. But as may be seen from the pamphlet issued by the opposition, the leaders of the opposition are striving to limit this work of the Party, and are sliding nearer and nearer to economism. The task arises of developing the most primitive forms of struggle by the workers and peasants, but the opposition more and more underestimates the illegal activities of the Party. The conditions of today demand a sharpening of the struggle against the remnants of sectarianism in the Party, remnants that hinder it from developing closer contacts with the masses, but the opposition in this question has taken the stand of forgiving the mistakes of Right opportunism. It is urgently necessary, with the view of developing the mass movement, really to carry out in practice flexible united front tactics, tactics which demand that the Party seeks and achieves agreement with the working class and peasant organizations which are now in the camp of the Shakai Taishuto. But factionalism can very easily transform this method of agreements into an end in itself and lose the revolutionary perspective.

The most dangerous form of bourgeois influence over the proletariat is social chauvinism. Among the masses of the working class the Party must fight against chauvinist sentiments with all decisiveness, but very patiently. In its own ranks the Party must be merciless not only towards all manifestations of social chauvinism but even towards the smallest tendencies to make concessions to it or to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards it. In present day Japan, any underestimation of the illegal work of the Party is nothing short of a rejection of Communism. In a war situation and under a terrorist regime, the role of illegal agitation grows manifold. The task of today is one of increasing manifold the illegal agitation of the Party, primarily against the preparation of war against the Soviet Union.

The tasks confronting the Party today cannot be fulfilled unless the essentially wrong estimate of the present position in Japan, as being one of the period of reaction, is decisively rejected. Such an estimate is current among the petty bourgeois and unstable elements of the opposition, who, according to *Sekki*, do not believe in the creative power of the masses and see only moods of impotency, moral disintegration, treachery and provocation. Undoubtedly the reactionary character of the monarchist regime has somewhat intensified in the last few years. The methods adopted by the government in the struggle against the working class and the enslaved peasantry have become more terroristic and fascist. But this once again confirms and emphasizes the power and revolutionary significance of the struggle being conducted by the masses of workers and peasants in this extraordinarily difficult situation of terror and mass chauvinist propaganda. It was in this situation, and notwithstanding the terrific resistance of the reformist trade union leaders, that the strike movement of the workers, and the struggle of the peasants against the landowners grew in 1934. The fact that this struggle originated spontaneously is not a sign of a fall in the militant activity of the workers and peasants. Quite the contrary, it is an expression of a growth of their militant activity. The dissatisfaction of the workers and

peasants is many times greater than the expression it finds in the open struggle of the masses. The number of participants in the various movements of the peasants to present petitions to parliament is growing. These movements are in the hands of the enemies of the peasants; nevertheless the movements themselves are undoubtedly proof of the growing dissatisfaction and activity of the broad masses of peasants.

By mobilizing all their forces to the last degree, the monarchist government and the ruling classes have succeeded in strengthening the chauvinist sentiments among certain sections of the workers and peasants. But it is also true that even the Silk Growers' Association, the mass peasant organization which is in the hands of bourgeois leaders, demanded from the government that part of the army and navy budget be utilized for peasant relief. This fact is a sign not only of the sharp dissatisfaction of the peasants with the government's policy. It is also an indication that there are big possibilities in the villages for anti-militarist work under the slogan of transferring money from the military budget to peasant aid.

A clear understanding by all Communists of the tasks confronting the Party today, and the struggle on two fronts, *viz.*, against Right opportunism and against the remnants of sectarianism, is the first thing necessary in order to rally the Party members to mobilize their energy, and to bring about a turn in the mass work of the Party. The fulfilment of this task requires first of all that the Central Committee elaborates and publishes its resolutions on the basic questions of today, *viz.*, on the struggle for the united front, on the ways and means of strengthening the mass work of the Party, on the struggle against war and chauvinism, on the consolidation of the Party (including the strengthening of Party discipline, livening up inner Party life, etc.) and on other current questions.

A wide discussion on these resolutions, and on the practical work and tasks facing the given local Party unit must be developed, under the leadership of the Central Committee, in all Party organizations and particularly in the factory nuclei. On the basis of self-criticism, the shortcomings of the given Party unit, and of the Party as a whole, must be brought to the fore, and ways and means must be indicated of strengthening the Party and of finding the way to win over the broad masses of the working class to the Party.

What must, however, not be permitted, is that this discussion be transformed into a factional discussion. It is essential that

“... every unit of the Party should pay strict attention to ensuring that the indubitably necessary criticism of defects and every analysis of the line of the Party or account of its practical experience and check-up of the fulfilment of its decisions as well as the means of correcting mistakes, etc., should be directed not towards discussion by groups adhering to some ‘platform’, but towards discussion by all the members of the Party.” (“Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., drafted by Lenin”, *Lenin's Works*, Vol. XXVI, p. 587, Russian edition.)

# The Press of the Communist Parties of France, Czechoslovakia, and England on the Soviet-French and Soviet- Czechoslovakian Treaties of Mutual Assistance

**G**ERMAN fascism is carrying on a violent campaign against the treaties of mutual assistance signed by the Soviet Union and two bourgeois countries, France and Czechoslovakia, not interested at the present time in forcing a war. The fascist press does not stop at any slander to distort the meaning of these facts and of the peaceful policy of the U.S.S.R. in general. This is quite understandable, for it is this peaceful policy that exposes German fascism as the chief instigator of war and which rallies together all the forces that can be used in the struggle for peace.

But even in the press of those bourgeois countries which do not at present support aggressive German fascism, even in the press of France and Czechoslovakia, all kinds of attempts are being made to distort the meaning of the defensive treaties of security and mutual assistance, concluded by the Soviet Union, attempts are made to set these efforts of the Soviet Union in opposition to the revolutionary struggles and to the proletarian united front against war and fascism.

The Social-Democratic press does its bit to help its bourgeoisie to solve this problem. It does this in different forms, depending upon the particular imperialist policy being pursued in its own country. Social-Democracy is trying to hide the fact from the workers that the peaceful policy of the U.S.S.R. is imbued with the spirit of proletarian internationalism and serves the interests of developing and consolidating the international working class movement.

The excerpts from the Communist press given below show how immediately after the signing of the treaties the Communist Parties came out in reply to the furious campaign of the bourgeois and Social-Democratic press, and having occupied a correct position, they formulated the tasks of the proletarian united front in the struggle for the defense of the U.S.S.R. and against the policy of their own bourgeoisie.

## I. THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

A meeting of five thousand Communists and members of the Paris district which took place on May 17, 1935, passed a resolution on this subject which contains the following passage:



"The Communists of Paris send their warm greetings to their great Comrade Stalin, whose wise words on the necessity of preserving peace and security will win the approval of the common people of France."

The same resolution says, further on:

"All those present express their joy at the fact that the Soviet Union, the bulwark of international peace, has won a new victory in its struggle for peace, through the signing of the treaty of mutual assistance between France and the U.S.S.R.

"The Party is happy to record that a new obstacle has been placed on the road to Hitler's, and of his French allies', fascist war policy.

"Under pressure of the masses of the people who are thirsting for peace, the French government, after long hesitation and much maneuvering, has finally decided to sign a treaty for the support of peace." (*l'Humanite*, May 18, 1935.)

At the same meeting, Comrade Thorez recalled the fact that:

"All the efforts of the Soviet Union directed for several years at first towards universal disarmament and then to partial disarmament, have been in vain; unfortunately they met with no response among the bourgeoisie. Therefore, only one thing remains:

"The treaty of mutual assistance which united peoples who are desirous of peace against those who have recourse to aggression." (*l'Humanite*, May 24, 1935.)

Comrade Thorez asks the question: "Where is the greatest danger of war?" The Theses of the Thirteenth E.C.C.I. Plenum which took place in December, 1933, and which every comrade should read once more, give the reply to this question. Therein we read:

"The fascist government in Germany—the chief inciter of war in Europe—is causing alarm in Danzig, Austria, the Saar, the Baltic states, etc." The events of the past eighteen months since the Plenum have shown the correctness of this appraisal given by the Communist International. The service we rendered is that we understand this first, and now the Second International also, in turn, has been forced to admit, in their May Day manifesto, that: "*As for Europe, the danger of war emanates from Hitler Germany.*" (*l'Humanite*, May 24, 1935.)

Comrade Cachin writes:

". . . it (fascism) wants war. If it is possible, we must prevent the realization of fascism's criminal plans.

"The treaty of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and of capitalist France, signed on May 2, serves no other purpose but this. Those who want to compare this treaty with the system of pre-war alliances are distorting the truth . . . the present treaty from the very beginning was proposed by the Soviet Union to Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States.

". . . Fascist Germany and Poland refused to sign the treaty. The Hitlerites and their accomplices—the Polish fascists—have

*refused* to help those countries which will become the object of the aggression of third countries. It was as a result of this refusal and also of the direct menace of peace on the part of Hitler that the Franco-Soviet treaty was signed on May 2. However, it should be added that as hitherto the opportunity is afforded to Hitler to cease his attacks against the Soviet Union and at any moment to join his signature to the treaty, which would be met with great satisfaction." (*l'Humanite*, May 24, 1935.)

The English *Daily Worker* gives the same opinion of the treaty as a means of fighting for peace:

"Already as a result of the Soviet Union's peace policy, a pact of mutual assistance has been concluded between the U.S.S.R. and France. This pact, which is absolutely devoid of anything in the nature of war-like intention, provides for the maintenance of peace, and places a strong deterrent in the way of those bellicose imperialist powers who are striving to set all Europe in flames." (*Daily Worker*, May 17, 1935.)

The Social-Democratic press of Czechoslovakia, even more so than the press of the French Socialists, tried to stupefy the workers with the statement that the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union is in contradiction to the struggle of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for peace, and that the true defenders of the Soviet Union are not the Communists, not the toiling masses, but the Czech Social-Democratic Party itself. Moreover, the Social-Democratic press was speculating on an alleged contradiction fabricated by themselves, existing between the communique and the position of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The leaders of the Czech Social-Democracy reckoned thereby to bring defeat to the Communists at the elections. It is important to note that these attempts met with complete failure. At the parliamentary elections, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, like the French Communist Party at the municipal elections, which took place after the treaties had been concluded, won big successes. Broad masses of the toilers voted in favor of the policy of the Communists, in favor of the consistent peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. This Social-Democratic intrigue was smashed by the Communist newspaper *Rude Pravo*:

"The Czechoslovakian-Soviet treaty is proof of the bankruptcy of the entire anti-Soviet policy of the Czech bourgeoisie. This treaty is a serious confirmation of the correctness of our policy. It is our cause, the cause of the Communists, the cause of the government of the Soviet Union. The treaty is one of the guarantees of the struggle against Hitler counter-revolution, but it is not the only surety. Not so long ago Comrade Stalin pointed out that Hitler imperialism must be confronted with a mighty force. The Socialists in the government are using these words in their own way against us; they want to persuade the workers that there is a contradiction between good and real Communists in the Soviet Union and bad Communists here, a contradiction between Stalin and Gottwald.

"What force can be put against Hitlerism? The force of

the bourgeoisie? No, only the emancipated people can stand against Hitler, only an emancipated people forms a real basis for the defense of the people against Hitler. The only fortress against the Hitler counter-revolution is the emancipated working class." (*Rude Pravo*, May 26, 1935.)

## II. THE PEACEFUL POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT

The leadership of the English Labor Party which the Hitler press openly greeted for its "unbiased" position (which they adopted on the question of the arming of Hitler Germany) was especially zealous, and is still so, in its efforts to prove that any agreements between the Soviet Union and bourgeois countries in general, and treaties of mutual assistance in particular, "are impermissible in principle". These reformist publicists make their appeal on behalf of "orthodoxy" of "class" tactics, interpreted in a way that suits the double game purposed by their imperialism in regard to German fascism, and waging a furious struggle on this question against Marxism-Leninism.

In the "Theses on the Present Political Situation" written by Comrade Lenin in May, 1918, as the basis of the Decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to concede to the German ultimatum and reject the treaty with the Anglo-French coalition, Lenin wrote:

"While we by no means reject, in general, military agreements with one of the imperialist coalitions against the other in cases where this treaty, without violating the fundamentals of the Soviet government, might strengthen its position and paralyze the offensive against her of one particular imperialist power, at the present moment we cannot enter into a military agreement with the Anglo-French coalition." (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXX, p. 384, Russian ed.)

In reply to the demagoguery of the Labor Party, the *Daily Worker* writes:

"This type of cunning propaganda will not deceive the workers. The latter are increasingly realizing that the Soviet Union by its policy, far from weakening the workers' fight, is helping to mobilize the revolutionary forces of the working class against capitalism. The successes won by the revolutionary candidates in the recent French elections provides convincing proof of this.

"What the U.S.S.R. is concerned with is not any defense of predatory interests of French imperialism, but the interests of peace, that is to say, the interests of the working class." (*Daily Worker*, May 17, 1935.)

Pointing out that capitalist contradictions must be used in the interests of the struggle for peace, the central organ of the English Communist Party correctly stated the opinion that this alone is not yet a real guarantee of peace.

"While utilizing capitalist differences to the utmost, neither the Soviet Union nor any intelligent worker treats this as a per-

manent or real guarantee of peace or security—which remains the organized strength of the U.S.S.R. and the workers elsewhere.” (*Daily Worker*, May 21, 1935.)

Defense of the U.S.S.R., is actually the struggle against fascism and war, writes *l'Humanite* in its issue of May 26:

“Our Czechoslovakian comrades are declaring, just as we said on the same subject in *l'Humanite*, that in the present international situation, the struggle of the toilers should be directed against fascism and the war which it wants to let loose. Defense of the toilers goes arm in arm with the general struggle against Hitler's barbarity and defense of the only proletarian state in the world.”

“The Soviet Union”, says Thorez in his speech, “is the thing which is most valuable to the international proletariat. That is why every effort should be made to defend it. This is our profound conviction which has determined our campaign over many years to support the policy of peace of the Soviet Union. We carried on this campaign alone against everybody, at a time when the enemies of the U.S.S.R., as yet had not recognized it, but were spreading all kinds of slander against it. It is this conviction which guides us in our campaign against reactionary elements in our country, and also the campaign which we are waging and will continue to wage against Laval, against the national government. It is this that determined our struggle to ensure that the will of the French people should be manifested in the signing of the treaty of mutual assistance.”

Comrade Thorez dwelt in detail upon the explanation of the need for the Soviet Union to maneuver situated as it is in capitalist surroundings.

“The service rendered by the Bolsheviks,” says he, “is that they prevented the coalition of the imperialists against peace.

“I want to explain this question properly by giving an excerpt from Lenin's letter to the American workers, in which our teacher points out that the road of revolution is not wide, nor free, nor straight.”

And Comrade Thorez calls upon the French workers to ponder over the words which Lenin wrote to the American workers seventeen years ago:

“To throw back the rapacious advancing Germans we made use of the equally rapacious counter-interests of the other imperialists, thereby serving the interests of the Russian and the international socialist revolution. In this way we served the interests of the working class of Russia and other countries, we strengthened the proletariat and weakened the bourgeoisie of the whole world, we used the justified practice of maneuvering, necessary in every war, of shifting and waiting for the moment when the rapidly growing proletarian revolution in a number of advanced countries had ripened.” (Lenin, *A Letter to American Workers*, p. 14.)



### III. IN EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT ARE THE TACTICS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE?

This is what Cachin writes on this point:

"I understand perfectly well that some French Socialists protest against the signing of the treaty just as the Laborites in Great Britain do. The latter openly carry on a foreign policy which *covers up all the actions of Hitler* behind a mask of pacifism. They approved of Hitler's action when he decided to introduce universal conscription. On March 26, 1935, the *Daily Herald* wrote, saying that Germany has now once more become an armed big power and it did consider that this could 'serve as an excuse for any kind of panic!'"

The fact that the English Laborites defended fascist Hitlerism in this way seemed (and one must say quite justifiably) too disgraceful for the German Socialist reformists, who energetically revolted against their colleagues from the Second International. Their protest was published in the last number of the *Revue pour le Socialism*, which is issued in Prague. Citizen Kern (Hilferding's own pseudonym) is foaming at the mouth at the Labor Party, "which has never ceased to incite francophobe feelings and accepts Hitler's pacifist protests as gospel truth". Hilferding even goes so far as to assert that the English Socialist leaders "*bear much of the responsibility for the development of events in Europe.*"

Let our comrades the Socialists think over Hilferding's words, let them beware of bringing grist to the mill of Hitler, the worst enemy of peace.

The heaviest accusation that can be leveled at the Labor Party is to accuse it of sympathy towards Hitler and German fascism.

The Communist press emphasizes the fact that because we do not trust the bourgeoisie any more than we did before, we must refuse to support the bourgeois fatherland.

"We Communists," says Duclot, "consider that the government which connives at the intrigues of the fascists, that postponed as far as possible the signing of the treaty, that proposed combinations to Hitler about which nobody knew, through intermediaries like *Jean Goy and Scapini*—a government like this cannot enjoy the confidence of the masses in guaranteeing peace.

*"The Communists have no faith whatever in the government of the bourgeoisie as an instrument for a policy of peace.*

"Given the Army can be used internally against the working class, and against the colonial peoples and against the Soviet Union, our party unswervingly stands opposed to reintroduction of the two years' military service, and maintains its absolute refusal to vote war credits.

"Determined not to allow the sabotage of the Franco-Soviet Pact by the warmongers, the Communists call upon the working masses of France to form themselves into a vast people's front, to put a stop to the financial plans of the government, designed to plunge the people into still greater misery, and to defend

peace and liberty, and to prepare for the victory of the great cause of the working class.

"Long live the unity of the workers!

"Long live the Soviet Union, bulwark of world peace!

"Long live Soviet France!

"*Today, as yesterday, we repeat that our class tactics were never so necessary as today, in our struggle against fascism and war. The proletariat can lay its hopes only upon itself, and not on Laval who is conducting a double game.*" (See Cachin's article in *l'Humanite*, May 23, 1935. Our italics—ed.)

The Communists of France are developing the struggle to drive out the fascist reactionary officers from the army!

"The French Communists and the French toilers cannot have confidence in the staff officers of the army of the French bourgeoisie. Among the officers of Weygan are many fascists, members of the *Croix de Feu*, and French adherents of Hitler. All the activities of the French fascists, which the French government is covering up, are proof of the fact that all their sympathies are on the side of German fascism, the chief culprit in connection with the war preparations in Europe.

"The Communists and toilers of France who are waging a violent struggle against fascism know that these people are prepared to betray the Franco-Soviet treaty in order to unite with Hitler against the Soviet Union. The forces which France can bring forward in defense of peace will be actual only when they are harnessed to the mighty activities of the toiling masses, tirelessly fighting against fascism and the bourgeoisie, and to drive fascist and reactionary officers out of the army." (See *l'Humanite*, May 16, 1935.)

#### THE COMMUNISTS WILL VOTE AGAINST WAR CREDITS

"This is why we fought and will continue to fight against any additional terms of service. This is why we shall not vote for war credits. This is why we refuse to support the mendacious slogan of a 'Sacred Union'. We, French Communists, are on the side of the Red Army—yes! but we are against the French big bourgeoisie, against fascism, and, *together with the French soldiers*, are in defense of peace." (See V. Couturier's article in *l'Humanite*, May 17, 1935.)

Communists continue to confront bourgeois national defense with international class defense of the proletariat:

". . . But does this mean that we are revising our principle position on the question of national defense? *No!*

"Shall we cease to fight against armaments traders? *No!*

"Shall we cease to vote against war credits? *No!*

"Shall we cease to defend soldiers from fascist cadres in the army and their counter-revolutionary demands? *No!*

"The bourgeois state, the bourgeois army still remains a weapon of oppression against the people, and it must be destroyed in order to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat *and to win our fatherland for ourselves.*

"Bourgeois national defense we shall continue to confront with *international class defense of the proletariat*. As hitherto, we do not accept the slogan of national defense either conditionally or unconditionally." (See article by V. Couturier in *l'Humanite*, May 19, 1935.)

The *Daily Worker* develops the same thought in its issue of May 21, 1935:

"The policy of the French (and British) Communists, therefore, remains unaltered, and Stalin's declaration only points the necessity for multiplying all efforts to organize the widest mass front against the war-making imperialists."

The fight against Hitlerism can be waged only on the basis of a broad anti-fascist front, only by a struggle for power. The Czech *Rote Fahne* in its issue of May 28, 1935, writes:

"It is essential to confront Hitler imperialism by a mighty force. But can this be the force of the Czech bourgeoisie, which through the policy it is pursuing, is leading the country to national ruin and encourages the weakening of the vital forces of the people? *No! This force will be the emancipated toiling people alone*, and therefore we are fighting against the Czech bourgeoisie."

In reply to the "fears" of the Socialists that the Communists by fighting on behalf of the treaty may find themselves "drawn into preparations for war", and compelled to give their approval to the law for the two years' term of service, Gabriel Peri writes:

"We are not allying ourselves to any sacred alliance and we have firmly decided with all our might to fight against the law for two years' term of service and against war credits. Why? Because this law is a law of political and social reaction, a fascist law, for the training of the professional army, the French Reichswehr; because the militarization aimed at by this law—at the insistence of the French Hitlerites—while not encouraging revolutionary defense against German Hitlerism, on the contrary, will betray the working class of France to Hitler barbarity.

"Defense against Hitlerism will be guaranteed not by a militarized and fascized nation, but by the masses of the people, rallied together in an anti-fascist front of freedom, filled with strong determination to save and to extend democratic liberties, strong enough to obtain satisfaction for the daily requirements of the working class. In fighting for power we are fighting against Hitlerism. And the fight for power is the struggle for the demands of the national front of the workers, peasants, soldiers and small traders, against the propertied ruling oligarchy and its allies, the French fascists."

Communists should demand of the government that it should actually carry out the provisions of the Franco-Soviet treaty, they should fight against its being sabotaged. In developing this idea, Comrade Duclot gave in his article a quotation from Comrade Lenin's letters to the Cen-

tral Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party on the tactics of the Communists towards the Kerensky government during the Kornilov uprising:

"It is my conviction that those who (like Volodarsky) roll down to defensism or (like other Bolsheviks) to a bloc with the S.R.'s, to *supporting* the Provisional Government, are unprincipled. This is absolutely incorrect, this is unprincipled. We shall become defensists *only after* the passing of power to the proletariat, *after* peace has been offered, *after* the secret treaties and connections with banks have been severed but *only after*. Neither the fall of Riga, *nor the fall of Petrograd* will make us defensists (I would like very much to have this read by Volodarsky). Until then we stand for a proletarian revolution, we are against the war, we are *not* defensists.

"And *even now* we must not support Kerensky's government. This is unprincipled. One may ask: must we not fight against Kornilov? Of course we must! But this is not the same thing; there is a dividing line here; it is being stepped over by some Bolsheviks who fall into 'conciliation', who allow themselves to be *carried away* by the flow of events.

"We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, *even as Kerensky's troops do*, but we do not support Kerensky. *On the contrary*, we expose his weakness. There is a difference. It is rather a subtle difference, but it is highly essential and one must not forget it.

"Wherein, then, consists the change of our tactics after Kornilov's revolt?

"In that we are changing the *form* of our struggle against Kerensky. Without in the least relaxing our hostility towards him, without taking back a single word said against him, without renouncing the task of overthrowing Kerensky, we say: we must *take into account* the present moment; we shall not overthrow Kerensky right now, we shall approach the task of struggling against him *in a different way*, namely, we shall point out to the people (which struggles against Kornilov) the *weakness* and vacillation of Kerensky. That has been done even before. Now, however, it has become the main thing. Therein lies the change.

"The change, further, consists in this, that the main thing is now to intensify our propaganda in favor of some kind of 'partial demands' to be presented to Kerensky, demands saying: arrest Milyukov; arm the Petrograd workers, summon the Cronstadt, Vyborg and Helsingfors troops to Petrograd; disperse the State Duma; arrest Rodzyanko; legalize the transfer of the landowners' lands to the peasants; introduce workers' control over bread and factories, etc., etc. With these demands we must address ourselves not only to Kerensky, *not so much* to Kerensky as to the workers, soldiers and peasants who have been *carried away* by the course of the struggle against Kornilov. Keep up their enthusiasm; encourage them to beat up the generals and officers who express themselves in favor of Kornilov; urge *them* to demand the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants; give *them* the idea of the necessity of arresting Rodz-



yanko and Milyukov, dispersing the State Duma, shutting down the *Ryech* and other bourgeois papers, and instituting investigations against them. The 'Left' S.R.'s must be especially pushed on in this direction." (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, pp. 137-38.)

In each country the Communists should concretely work out the question of the struggle against war, in defense of the U.S.S.R., reckoning with and exposing the policy of their bourgeoisie in all circumstances. . . . The struggle of the Communists, writes Duclot, is directed towards realizing the chief aim—the victory of socialism—this is what determines the position of the Communists in relation to different types of war.

"We, Communists," writes Duclot, "fought for the signing of the treaty, which Laval did his utmost to postpone by maneuvers and combinations.

"And now we shall fight against all those who in one form or another want to sabotage this pact.

"Sabotage of the treaty is of advantage to the Hitlerites and their policy of war, and he who says that the Franco-Soviet treaty is not a peace treaty is lying in the most shameless manner and is trying to mislead the masses of the people. . . . The Communists are fighting for peace, but if, despite all this, war nevertheless breaks out, if Hitler fascism hurls itself against the Soviet Union, will it not be the duty of French Communists to demand that the treaty be put into force, and to refuse to allow the French Hitlerites to be successful in drawing France into an anti-Soviet war together with Hitler?

"In a situation of this kind, Communists should be guided only by the desire to guarantee the defeat of the enemies of peace who make an attack upon the U.S.S.R.

"The defeat of Hitler, the most dangerous enemy of peace, is a defeat which not only the French, but also the German Communists are striving for, for it would not only be a victory on the part of the Soviet Union, but also a victory of peace, a victory of the German people with all the consequences which follow therefrom.

"It goes without saying that if such a situation arises whereby civil war breaks out in Germany while France is fighting on the side of the U.S.S.R. against Hitler, it is extremely likely that the reactionary cliques of France will try to unite with Hitler in an anti-Communist war. . . .

"In the struggle for peace the Communists should not forget that the victory of socialism alone will destroy forever the causes of new bloody wars." (See Duclot's article in *l'Humanité*, May 24, 1935.)

"In the event of a counter-revolutionary war against the fatherland of socialism," writes Thorez, "we shall support with all our might the Red Army of the Soviet Union, and shall fight for the defeat of all powers that wage war against the Soviet Union." (*l'Humanité*, May 24, 1935.)

After the signing of the treaties of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and France and Czechoslovakia, after the elections to the Czech

parliament during which the Communists increased their vote by 100,000 votes, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia sent an open letter to the Socialist Party, proposing the establishment of a united front in the struggle for peace, bread and work. The contents of this letter, as given by *l'Humanite* \*) in its issue of June 5, are as follows:

"It (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) proposes the formation of an *organization for socialist struggle*, consisting of Communists, Social-Democrats and Czech Socialists, and that an alliance of struggle for bread, work and peace should be concluded."

The open letter contains a detailed economic program: its aim is to lay the burden of the crisis upon the rich.

It also contains a proposal concerning the organization of struggle against fascist alliances and, incidentally, a demand that the whole of the state apparatus, the army and the police be cleansed of fascist elements, full political rights for all working class organizations, and preparations for a general strike in the event of attacks on the part of the fascists.

On the basis of the fact that only a struggle against the oppression of German workers in Sudeten can put the reins on Hitler's demagogy, the open letter demands:

"Confiscation of the property of all German capitalists in Sudeten who give their support to the German fascist movement, the funds obtained thereby to be used to help the unemployed;

"The distribution of food tickets among the unemployed in districts populated by Germans; confiscation of large landed property of the old German gentry and squires, who support the 'German Front in Sudeten', of the Heylein National Socialist Party, and the distribution of these lands among the small German peasantry."

In its open letter the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia provides for several measures in defense of peace and the independence of Czechoslovakia, and in defense of the Soviet Union.

In this connection the Communist Party puts forward the following proposals: the struggle to clear out fascist generals and officers from the army, the extension of electoral rights to soldiers, full freedom of anti-fascist propaganda in the army and propaganda in favor of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, soldiers to be afforded the right to elect their own trustees in the army, a struggle to bring the army closer to the toiling people, organization of friendly connections between the soldiers of the Czechoslovakian army and the Red army.

The Communist Party will continue to struggle against the participation of the Socialist Parties in the government. Nevertheless it declares that it is prepared to give the support of its votes in parliament to all proposals which are capable of bringing some degree of assistance to the toiling population!

\*) In the Czech Communist press, a whole paragraph of this letter was confiscated by the censor. We quote, therefore, from the French press.

# If Maxton Were a Dictator \*

By W. RUST

COMMUNISM and fascism are questions widely discussed in Britain. Most bourgeois publishers in their attempts to exploit the popular interest for mere money making, publish different books on this issue.

In this category falls the *If I Were a Dictator* series of books published by Messrs. Meuthen & Co., Ltd. The title itself is sufficient to betray the character of these little books which solve the great social questions of the day according to the idiosyncrasies and whims of the particular author. All the authors promise a very happy and pleasant dictatorship in which everything will be all right for everyone if only they do as they are told. What lovely dictatorships, cry all the literary critics; it would be a pleasure to live under them. Sometimes these press notices are quoted by the publishers in order to advertise the books and as they are an important indication of petty bourgeois opinion we will requote from them.

"Lord Dunsany is the first, and I cannot imagine a more kindly amusing dictator. I don't think I should mind having my life re-ordered by this gentle humorous despot." *Sunday Dispatch*.

"We can only pray that if it comes to a dictatorship in this country we may be able to induce one of the two gentlemen (Julian Huxley and St. John Ervine) to take over the job and that we may obey him cheerfully." *Yorkshire Post*.

". . . this most stimulating and entertaining series." *The Times Literary Supplement*.

The glorification of a personal dictator and the presentation of the benevolent dictatorship for the welfare of all those who allow themselves to be dictated to belongs undoubtedly to the stock in trade propaganda of fascism which tries to deceive masses of people, particularly the middle classes, with demagogic promises about the glorious time to come if full confidence is placed in the shining personality of the leader. The books in the series *If I Were a Dictator* are not fascist books but they do help fascist propaganda and they do show how the ideology of fascism is beginning to get a grip on the British intelligentsia.

A few years ago it would have been impossible to have found intellectuals contributing to such a series. The idea of dictatorship would have been abhorrent to them, they would have much preferred to discuss the delights and charms of democratic government. But today all this is changed, they are now waiting for a dictator to turn up, fancying

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\* *If I Were a Dictator*, by James Maxton.



themselves in the role and preparing the way for the coming of the Leader who will magically change the world.

The appearance of one of these books over the name of James Maxton, Chairman of the Independent Labor Party, will come as a surprise to those workers who read one or more of the preceding volumes. But Maxton's strange company is no stranger than the contents of this book.

From the chairman of a party which has declared for a revolutionary policy one would at least have expected a determined attempt to break through the Utopia-weaving of the previous authors and the setting down in the realistic terms of the issues before the working class in the struggle against the present capitalist dictatorship and for the establishment of the workers' dictatorship. But Maxton does not do this. He falls into step with the other authors, he manufactures his own ridiculous utopia and only in passing mentions that

"The new world is not to be born with the dictator as its midwife. The will for its birth must come from the masses of ordinary people in every land feeling within themselves the inevitable necessity of the change."

Thus only at the very end of the book, and even so in a very hazy language, is introduced the conception that the working class itself must carry through the socialist revolution and build up the new socialist society. The book, as a whole, is devoted to the comical Maxtonian utopia, where the world dictator destroys the weapons of war, gives everybody £4 a week, makes simplified English the world language, reforms the prisons and allows children to run wild. But withal, Maxton cannot bring himself to abolish the policeman although in the opening chapter he makes a clean-up of all the admirals and generals and finds them jobs as door-keepers and porters. The policemen, however, must stay. "We shall have to retain the policemen, at least for a period, although his thief-catching duty will, we hope, become a minor part of his work, and the task of keeping the peace should not be arduous."

It is possible that Maxton's plan for a world dictatorship is in keeping with his ideas regarding a future socialist state. The I.L.P. has long occupied itself with paper plans for reorganizing capitalism along "reasonable" lines, and the Fabian experts are working out their schemes to the last detail although it was never customary to place such emphasis on the policeman. But the present I.L.P. has decided to discard the reformist utopias, to abandon schemes for the reorganization of capitalism and even to drop the idea of ending capitalism by means of a "pacifist technique of revolution".

So far, however, the I.L.P. has not succeeded in decisively setting itself on the revolutionary road and the struggle between reformism and revolution is still being waged within its ranks with the majority of the leadership on the side of reformism. Therefore, Maxton's book



is largely made up of the old utopias, and only at the end is the class struggle referred to.

There is no need to examine the details of the dictatorship proposed by Maxton. The question is the one to which we have already referred, the fact that Maxton ignores the class struggle and caricatures socialism in such a way as to remove it from its scientific basis and to lump it together with the personal dictatorships of the previous authors who assist the spreading of fascist ideology.

Maxton's book does not help but only hinders the realization of the fundamental task facing all revolutionaries in Great Britain, namely, that of the struggle to establish the proletarian dictatorship. This hard and difficult task demands a fearless exposure of capitalism and a realistic facing of the problems of the new socialist society the construction of which must be achieved by the working class itself. In its resolution, "For a Soviet Britain", the Communist Party carefully tackles this task and answers the question of the way out of the capitalist crisis, and the methods of the fight for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of Soviets as the governmental organ of the workers' state. The workers' dictatorship has nothing in common with a personal dictatorship. The dictatorship of the workers is directed against their class enemies, the ruthless suppression of all counter-revolutionaries, but a wide democracy for the workers who will elect their Soviets and hold all the means of production in their own hands.

As yet the meaning of this revolutionary road, the only road to socialism is little understood by wide masses of British workers. They have been nurtured on the illusion that parliamentary government means democracy and that socialism can be achieved through voting for Labor Governments. The reformist leaders make unceasing efforts to distort the policy of revolutionary struggles and with the slogan of "Against All Dictatorships" they try to discredit the proletarian dictatorship by confusing it with fascism—the open dictatorship of the financial oligarchy.

To popularize the revolutionary line and expose the reformist leaders with their mighty engines of propaganda is an obligation on the shoulders of every revolutionary worker. But Maxton, who claims to be a revolutionary, has produced a book on dictatorship which not only does not give an answer to reformism but turns the whole question of revolutionary policy into a screaming farce and presents socialism as belonging to the species of benevolent dictatorships favored by the fascist-inclined intellectuals.

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